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Marshall believed that citizenship rights offered a good antidote to the 
inequalities produced by capitalism. This article suggests that we currently need: 
a) to widen the tasks of citizenship and evaluate it according to its effectiveness 
as an antidote to the inequalities existing in civil society (for example in gender 
or ethnic differences), but: b) not to trust citizenship when it is completely 
disconnected from civil society, as this is likely to lead not only to inequalities, 
but also differences and limitations to public power. A good citizenship model 
should come from the organisation of the weaker groups in civil society, 
deriving from their ability to permeate the state and to take advantage of it 
(following the emancipatory societal model).
To test this thesis, it is necessary to judge the value of the emancipatory 
societal model, assessing it on the basis of the quality of the rights it produces. 
To doing this, we have singled out three key features (extension, incidence and 
pluralism) of the three types of rights (civil, political and social) which make up 
citizenship.
We conclude by observing the current transformation in economic forces, 
including the impact of globalisation, which is eroding the chances of 
maintaining valid rights for citizens in Europe. The weaker classes in difficulty 
due to increasing competition within the workforce, both at the domestic and 
international level; popular suffrage has less importance than previously because 
of the loss of power of national elective bodies to non-elective technical and 
supranational ones. All these factors are causing European models to shift 























































































































































































As is well known, it was Thomas Marshall who invented the concept of 
citizenship. The English sociologist was the first to point out, in 1949. that 
citizens of contemporary states are provided not only with a certain number of 
political and civil rights, but also social ones. He introduced, in this way. a 
politological interpretation of citizenship, as distinct from the judicial one. 
which distinguishes the citizen from the foreigner.
Marshall claimed that in contemporary political systems to be a citizen, in 
the judicial sense, also means having access to public protection of one’s 
material wealth, in other words, welfare. In fact, we should add -  an aspect 
which Marshall failed to note - that foreigners too may be entitled to many rights 
if they reside in a country. Marshall therefore identified an important 
phenomenon, but did not provide a reply to three crucial questions. What 
distinguishes the different models of citizenship? Can we say that some models 
do their job better than others? What is their future? However, in inviting us to 
consider citizenship as antidote to inequalities produced by the market, Marshall 
made a point that is useful in attempting to answer these three questions. We 
could evaluate the various models measuring them in terms of their 
effectiveness in counterbalancing the effects of the market.
Since Marshall, the concept of citizenship has also been used to assess the 
public treatment of gender differences and ethnic minorities. Today, as a result, 
we have to widen the spectrum of our evaluation, judging citizenship as a tool 
for opposing not only class inequalities, but all social privileges. This means we 
need to focus attention on the relationship between citizenship and society, as 
well as the relationship between citizenship and the market. For the same reason, 
we cannot limit ourselves to examining the welfare protection that citizenship 
rights can offer, but have to bear in mind their capacity to safeguard the dignity 
of social groups and to empower the weaker categories.
Understood in this way, citizenship rights are a means of emancipating 
people and groups from their position in civil society, from prejudice and from 
closures, by giving them the same power and the same dignity through public 
action. According to this definition, citizenship should be a publicly provided 
good, to protect people against the inequalities of society. But past and modem 
Jacobine experience has taught that, when completely stripped of social 
resources, power and identity, citizens risk remaining with no defence even 
against public action. We therefore need to question the vitality and also the 
desirability of citizenship models which have no roots at all in civil society. At 
the same time, citizenship would fail as an emancipatory tool if it were not able 



























































































citizenship to accomplish the difficult task not only of protecting collective 
identities and respecting autonomies, but also attacking privilege and fighting 
prejudice. This kind of citizenship, which has to be built between state and 
society, without leaning too much one way or the other, is inevitably precarious 
and at times contradictory.
But, can we demonstrate that a satisfactory form of citizenship must 
necessarily be built between society and state? To reply, we first need to define 
the features of a satisfactory model of citizenship. To measure the effectiveness 
of the various forms of citizenship (their capacity to emancipate without 
imposing new constraints), we have to single out the main desirable dimensions 
of political, civil and social rights that citizenship can provide. I suggest that in 
relation to political rights we should consider three dimensions: (1) the 
extension-equality of the vote, i.e. the extension of suffrage, equality of active 
and passive votes, and so on; (2) the incidence-weight of the vote, i.e. the 
relative importance of the institutions voted for and of elective bodies as 
opposed to non-elective bodies, e.g. the relevance of Parliament and other 
elective bodies in comparison to technical bodies existing at the national and 
international level. Furthermore, we should consider whether the visible 
decisions that the voters can control are as important as non visible decisions, 
secret agreements and intrigues, since when democracy is not transparent, the 
vote has limited relevance; (3) the pluralism-competitiveness of the “products” 
voted for, i.e. the range of legitimate political offer within which the elector can 
choose freely. It is obvious that a one-party system offers little choice, but a 
system where voters have to choose between parties with almost identical 
programmes and indistinguishable ethical behaviour also presents a menu of 
limited variety.
We can attempt to “score” the different models through a series of 
questions which serve as a basis for empirical research. How many people have 
political rights? Do they all have the same rights? Until when was the plural vote 
allowed, i.e. the possibility for privileged categories of electors to make use of a 
number of votes? Is the proportion between electors and elected representatives 
the same over the whole country, i.e. is the representative percentage of different 
areas and regions constant, or are there some privileged areas where a small 
number of electors have a large number of representatives? Is the proportion 
between electors and elected representatives the same for all parties, i.e. are 
there some parties (e.g. the small ones) which cannot be represented because 
they do not reach the required quota or minimum share of votes, are there voters 
who have to “pay” their representatives more votes than those voting for larger 
or geographically more concentrated parties? In other words, to what extent is 
the system truly proportional? How radical or extremist are the parties accepted 




























































































proposals contained in the parties’ programmes? Are the policies adopted by the 
majority and those proposed by the opposition real alternatives? How strong is 
the impact on decision-making processes of agreements not exposed to the vote 
or even the knowledge of voters?
As far as social rights are concerned, 1 suggest three features are 
considered: (1) extension-redistribution, the percentage of people who benefit 
from state social security and education programmes, the equality of these 
rights, or the extent to which they compensate for inequalities due to place, 
occupation, gender, culture or religion, i.e. the capacity to reinforce or to 
contrast social inequality. If we wish to evaluate the emancipatory pou'er of the 
various citizenship models this dimension must be linked with: (2) the 
incidence-impact, that is the generosity and reliability of the provisions, i.e. the 
ability of welfare to really provide people with income assurances, services and 
education when compared with the market, family or other sources of support; 
(3a) pluralism-differentiation, the level of variation of provision by place, 
occupation, gender, culture and religion, i.e. the culturally diversified character 
of social rights; and also, (3b) the autonomy, strength and degree of 
independence of organised civil society providers v. public providers, i.e. the 
extent to which the former are able to procure public funding and avoid control, 
or at least maintain control of contributions and donations made privately by 
their subscribers.
We need to be careful not to confuse point 1) with 3a) and 3b). In fact, it 
is possible to have rights of different relative strength for different social 
categories, as in corporate models, where diversity strengthens inequality. But, 
we can also have culturally differentiated rights with the same weight, as in the 
case of equal public financing for schools for different minorities - in this case 
diversity respects differences. There may also be rights that are of almost equal 
weight, but managed by autonomous bodies (for a long time the case for 
pensions in Scandinavia). It is not always possible to distinguish between (3a) 
and (3b) when observing empirical cases of transition to citizenship, because in 
the past autonomy and differentiation tended to coincide: autonomy was a 
precondition to differentiation. More in general, 1 do not intend to deal 
specifically with civil and cultural rights1, as they are partially included in the 
second dimension of both political and social rights.
For the sake of completeness, we assess the same three dimensions - 
extension, incidence and pluralism - in relation to civil rights: (1) extension- 
inclusion, i.e. the number of people, or members of a community, who have




























































































access to full {pleno jure) citizenship, and therefore the opportunity to act. be 
equal in the face of the law and to vote, “independently*' of sex. religion, or 
group of origin. In this field too, the path to citizenship can proceed with long 
strides or small steps, as for example in the case of the emancipation of women 
compared with the emancipation of small minority groups. This category of 
rights has another important dimension: (2) incidence-liberating power. As for 
social rights, civil rights too have a differing ability to free everyday life from 
need, from market trends and destiny. Their impact can vary enormously - from 
freeing people of unbearable burdens to removing slight limitations or 
discrimination. Compare, for example, the consequences of the abolition of 
slavery with the abolition of professional registers, or the abolition of serfdom 
with the abrogation of gender discrimination in transmitting citizenship rights to 
the husband or wife. The impact of the introduction of new civil laws on the 
lives of those involved can be very different. Civil rights may help people to 
leave their village, corporation, their ancestor’s religion or clan without paying 
an unbearable price - this is the emancipation aspect, whose extent and power 
we try to evaluate. But there are two opposite approaches to diversity: the rights 
may produce indifference towards social and cultural features, making it 
possible to forget them, or can allow people to remember them and value them 
as an inheritance, protecting their difference. This is the third dimension (3), 
pluralism-difference. Civil rights can protect minorities against forced 
deportation, against the destruction of their villages, or forced division, but can 
also make it possible to conserve ancient customs not accepted by majorities, 
and can enable closures: linguistically separate parties, strong federalism, and 
reserved quotas in public bodies.
The dividing line between the three categories of rights - political, social 
and civil - is arbitrary and often blurred. The extension of the vote to women is 
both a political right and a civil liberation from prejudice. The freedom given to 
foreigners to create their own political associations (granted in France only in 
1981) is both a civil right of association and a political right of participation. But 
simply listing the three dimensions already enables us to highlight the “hybrid” 
character of a desirable form of citizenship.
It is impossible to maximise all the positive features at he same time: for 
instance, it is difficult to combine high competitiveness and plurality of political 
parties with the ability to elect a stable government. In fact, a system based on 
too many quarrelling parties will tend to produce discretionary and changing 
majorities. Similarly, it is difficult to reconcile the protection of the traditions 
and roots of social groups with the freedom of the individual to break these 
bonds. Although it may seem wise to attempt to maximise one single feature of 
citizenship, it has always proved dangerous. For example, to give priority to the 




























































































decision, can make it extremely difficult to protect some spheres from the 
domination of the majority and, as a consequence, to defend minority rights or 
human rights in general. The abrogation of the death penalty or the religious 
freedom of small unaccepted groups would be in danger if left to the discretion 
of the electorate.
A perfect citizenship model, combining all the desirable features does not 
exist, but we should not conclude that all forms of citizenship are equally 
unsatisfactory. There are in reality various combinations which offer citizens 
“packages” of different degrees of acceptability. Some models in fact have very 
low levels of desirability but, as we shall see, there was one model which 
achieved a relatively satisfactory combination of desirable features.
This model is the most modem one, and perhaps for this reason emerges 
from the comparison better than the others. In fact, I have focused mostly on the 
past, observing the first buds of citizenship rights appearing in various European 
countries, not their full flowering. For this reason, the models presented should 
be seen as prototypes, useful for understanding the more recent versions found 
in both democratic and authoritarian governments. Although 1 avoid directly 
citing the most recent models, some of them appear clearly behind their 
predecessors.
This essay, based on the past, concludes with a look at the future, 
providing a tentative reply to the question left unanswered by Marshall. 
Observing the future leads us to link the politological sense of citizenship with 
the juridical sense. What happens if a significant part of the population of 
resident foreigners is deprived of certain citizenship rights?
We have said that good citizenship should be balanced between society 
and state. In order to construct the four prototypes of citizenship, I have 
therefore made a distinction firstly between state-centred models (more 
influenced by the state) and society-centred models (more influenced by civil 
society), and secondly between conservative and emancipating models.
Four Types of Citizenship
The four types of citizenship presented here should be considered ideal-types. I 
have drawn them from some historical cases in their “genetic” phase of 
transition from oligarchic and authoritarian regimes to democracy, i.e. the early 
stages of emergence of citizenship rights. Some of the features singled out still 
characterise contemporary regimes and can prove helpful in distinguishing not 





























































































The first alternative considered is between state and society. In the former 
(“statist” types), it is the state that tends to give shape to civil society, in the 
latter (“societal” types), it is civil society that reflects itself on the state. Where 
and why does one or the other appear? Which factors condition the emergence 
of one model rather than another? It is the level of conflict and competition that 
explains the insurgence of the different types.
Statist types are generally a response to situations of strong conflict 
between strong actors, both at the national and international level, in the political 
and economical field, and in groups with different traditions and culture. 
Societal systems, on the other hand, tend to be a response to conditions of weak 
conflict and competition, or conflicts between highly unbalanced forces where 
the antagonists are not in a position to do any harm, or else conditions of such 
well balanced conflict that, after many hard-fought attempts, the rivals decide on 
a strategic agreement. There are no reasons for violent conflict because the 
strength of the contenders is too unequal (the result is so predictable that there is 
no point in expending effort in fighting) or because it is too well-balanced (the 
result is too unpredictable and expensive).
The coalitions in power in societal models are broad and safe enough not 
to feel they need massive state intervention to survive. The national economies 
are competitive enough to be successful without state protection, and the 
dominant cultures impose themselves as a result of their hegemonic strength, 
either because they are convincing, even to outsiders, or because other cultures 
are too weak even to attempt to oppose them. Power relations are already 
satisfactorily established in civil society and the market, so there is no need for 
state intervention.
The other dimension I use for my typology - following Marshall’s implicit 
suggestion -  is that which underlies the ability of citizenship to emancipate new 
ranks, groups and categories. In fact, paradoxically, new citizenship rights may 
be introduced with the aim of maintaining old social and political balances. For 
this reason, we have to distinguish between emancipating and conservative 
models. In previous studies (1989, 1992), I have already tried to identify the 
factors that could possibly have an influence on the emergence of different 
citizenship models. I now represent them in a revised form.
1) Level and Form o f Domestic Political Conflict.
la) The ideological distance between the actors, the degree to which their 




























































































o f fragmentation, the number of relevant actors - this is related to the solution of 
previous conflicts, such as those between Church and State or between different 
language and ethnic groups'. Low levels of conflict and the absence of cleavages 
or lines of cultural resistance able to effectively counteract state action make 
repressive action and a strong central state less necessary.
Low conflictuality may also result from the fragile nature of culturally or 
politically radical groups, or the presence of hostile but apathetic or disorganised 
groups. Persistent conflict with a strong and well organised actor, such as the 
Church, justifies state intervention, although this may have more or less effect, 
according to the power relations in the country. On the other hand, a situation of 
social balance between linguistic and religious minorities, or repeated fights 
without a clear winner, can lead to “consociational” solutions, or a partition of 
the state and self-determination or autonomy of the groups also at a local level, 
i.e. solutions which are more societal than statist. Balanced cultural 
fragmentation gives way to a subtype of societal model, where the state is 
shaped by a society already solidly organised in groups, based not only on class 
divisions, but also on linguistic and religious ones.
2) Level o f Economic Competition.
2a) The degree o f exposure of the most important sectors of economy to foreign 
competition. 2b) The degree o f competitiveness of the most important sectors of 
economy. What matters is not only the strength of industry in the international 
market (therefore requiring less state protection), but the relative weight of 
industry in comparison, for example, to agriculture and the competitiveness of 
the latter. For the same reason, the possibility of exporting raw materials to 
counterbalance weaknesses in industry is important.
The same applies in the analysis of the present: it is necessary to look at 
the exposure and competitiveness of the main sectors of the national economy. 
The exposure of contemporary economies is greater with respect to the cases 
which I have analysed, and also in comparison with the times in which Marshall 
was writing. Functions which were previously linked to the land are now mobile 
and can be moved abroad. This is true not only for services to industry, such as 
accounting and promotion, but industrial production too which, due to the low 
costs of transportation and persisting high wage differentials are often being re­
located in other parts of the world. In brief, it is necessary to analyse the degree 
of openness (dependence on international business and finance) and the degree 2
2 Rokkan (1973) would say the number and intensity of the cleavages at the beginning of the 
process of extension of citizenship and during its course. Sartori (1976) would speak about 




























































































of global competition of the economy.
An economy which is both too exposed and not competitive enough 
requires state intervention to take off and be successful. But the loss of 
competitiveness does not necessarily induce greater statism. In this case, it is the 
cultural features and political choices which are important. One can choose to 
reduce the cost and the protection of labour, as conservative majorities did in the 
eighties. The arrival of centre-left majorities on the political scene in the major 
European countries at the end of the nineties has brought back into fashion the 
use of public investment or reduction in the cost of money to stimulate the 
economy. Ideologies can orient policies towards protectionism and public 
intervention or the decrease of guarantees for workers, but transformations in the 
form of international economical competition represent a constraint for decision­
makers.
3) Level o f International Con flict.
3a) The presence or not of a state o f war. 3b) The degree of international 
tension for the control of certain areas of influence or resources. A state of war 
or high tension tends to make systems shift to statist models, and the emphasis 
on external fractures or cleavages reduces or represses internal cleavages. This 
leads to strong limits on the acceptance of pluralism, even by societarian 
regimes, and obliges decision-making power to be organised centrally and 
vertically. The decisions of the central executive power are transmitted to the 
other central powers (Parliament and Magistracy) and to local administrations in 
a rigid way (rigid transmission rules).
3c) A statist imprint can come to the system from the coincidence o f the 
beginning o f citizenship rights and national unification obtained through war. 
The difficulties of state and nation-building and the frequency of war depend on 
the geopolitical position of the country concerned (Rokkan 1970, 1975; Tilly 
1975, 1981, 1990).
Because of the need of the state to support war industry, conditions of war 
tend to lead to even more protection of the national economy than the economic 
factors cited above. The creation of a more competitive modem army may also 
be an important cause of statism (Ralston, 1990), but this depends on the 
context. Roosevelt, for instance, paid for the agreement of the conservatives to 
enter the war with concessions to reduction in welfare. In this case, entry into 
war had to be negotiated with important economic groups rather than the 
soldiers who were sent to the Front. American participation involved more 
economic investment and expense than human investment. In fact the army was 




























































































World Wars. The absence of a conscript army is a typical societal feature.
4) Breadth and Power o f Dominant Coalitions.
4a) The presence or not of a hegemonic, pluralist and inclusive coalition. The 
feature of this type of coalition is an alliance between social classes and/or 
political actors which is so strong that it does not need to use repressive 
measures against adversaries and is able to display pluralistic and inclusive 
behaviour towards social and political opponents. This syndrome contrasts with 
the presence of non-hegemonic coalitions, which are sectarian and exclusive, 
needing to use state action to impose themselves and maintain order. Up to now, 
this variable is similar to that cited in point (1): a strong hegemony feeds on 
cohesion, and produces a low rate of conflict. 4b) whether or not new actors are 
included in the winning coalitions, and the characteristics (dominant or 
subordinate) o f new actors within the winning coalitions. The emancipating 
rather than conservative nature of societal or statist strategies depends on the 
role played by the emerging classes and political actors, i.e. whether the 
coalition they are part of is winning or losing, and whether their presence inside 
the winning coalition is dominant or subordinate. When they are losing or are 
subordinate, we find conservative models - those which involve new actors in 
the political system (otherwise we could not detect the incipience of citizenship), 
but keep them in a subordinate condition.
5) Culture o f the Ruling Elite and Conception of Citizenship.
5a) The criteria for legitimating power and citizenship. Here we may have, on 
the one hand, the conviction that the power of the prince is based on divine 
investiture or that the charismatic leadership of a chief is due to a natural and 
special bond that links him to his people. On the other, there is the argument for 
political representation based on ability or on social eminence, or the belief that 
popular sovereignty should be the only source of legitimate power. The former 
interpretation (investiture, charisma) supports the statist and stabiliser models, as 
these are able to justify the autonomy of public power from civil society. Their 
modem versions are the arguments in favour of stable executive powers, 
removed from stormy public opinion and the intemperance of the electorate -  
the idea that important decisions should be taken by technical bodies which are 
not politically influenced by the representatives elected by the people. A screen 
between state and civil society, between the public and social arena, may also 
consist, especially in countries of immigration, of ethnic concepts of citizenship 
in the judicial sense. One becomes a citizen, a member of a community, not 
because one lives, acts, works or studies there, but because it is the place where 
one’s ancestors were bom. In this way, citizenship is detached from social 




























































































principles. A non-societal concept of citizenship is typical of German law 
which, until very recently, refused to accept as citizens the sons or even the 
grandchildren of immigrants bom and bred in the country, but automatically 
gave that precious status to people who had a German ancestor, even if they 
themselves were bom and bred outside Germany.
The privilege given to the jus sanguinis follows an anti-societal logic. 
This can reach extreme consequences when people who have lived for centuries 
in a country and communities who have contributed considerably to the wealth 
and cultural richness of that country are deprived of certain civil and political 
rights - including citizenship or even life itself - only because they are part of a 
religious or cultural minority, despite the fact that they may have already 
abandoned it as individuals. This was the case of the Holocaust.
The criteria of legitimisation of power, representation and citizenship - in 
a juridical sense - can reinforce the societal conservative model, but only when it 
affects a single part of society which is considered worth admitting to the 
community or representing in government. In this way, when we establish that 
the granting of a residence permit depends on having a regular job (when it is 
well known that most immigrants work in the informal economy), we are not 
behaving so differently from those liberal regimes which allowed the vote only 
to stable workers, and disenfranchised vagrants and temporary workers.
Fully accepted popular sovereignty - as the equal sovereignty of disparate needs 
and opinions, and the acceptance of change in the composition of the “sovereign 
people”, such as that caused by the permanent settlement of waves of 
immigrants - supports the emancipating societal model.
By contrast, sovereignty may be offered to some people, i.e. to the non 
established or non wealthy classes, but exclude the unqualified or those 
considered incapable of correctly understanding their own “real” needs and 
those of the country (those whose views on public good do not coincide with the 
views of the ruling élite). This interpretation justifies emancipatory statism in its 
more authoritarian versions. Reactionary or revisionist citizens become 
“foreigners”, deprived of their citizenship rights, imprisoned, deported or killed. 
Its contemporary version, which is softer and more democratic, works through 
assimilation. Only those foreigners who conform to the culture of the receiving 
country, who understand and accept its superior modernity, are entitled to 
become citizens.
5b) The ways o f reaching optimal social and economical order - through 
spontaneous processes or agreements among social groups, or through state 
intervention directed by the enlightened élite. In the conservative societal 




























































































conventions already accepted in civil society. In state-centred models, on the 
other hand, it originates from an innovative volition3. What changes is the role 
assigned to the state, not only in the guidance of the economy, but also in the 
ethical education of citizens. Hence the educational value of a conscript army 
and state schools. Not only the means, but also the desirable targets are different. 
5c). The configuration o f the optimal social order, the acceptance, also in a 
democratic context, of the role of the traditional élite, of the great families, the 
favour accorded to co-operation among the various components of society, the 
tendency towards equality and the dismantling of hierarchies and assignment of 
social roles through birth.
I realise that, in explaining the different citizenship models as a set of 
dependent variables, I am using the political culture of the political actors as an 
independent variable, capable of influencing the actors’ strategy and consequent 
"production” of citizenship rights. 1 am assuming as a limit to the action 
something which could be considered its very engine. 1 could have considered 
the culture as the original project of the political action, and the other variables 
as constraints 4. I prefer to consider culture too as a limit to political action, 
whose specific aim is the occupation of the places where decisions are taken, the 
so-called “decision-making arenas”. The factors listed influence, but do not 
determine behaviour, because I postulate that the political actor acts with a 
certain initiative and autonomy towards the constraints he or she has to deal 
with5.
I therefore propose we represent the strategies which produce citizenship 
through the action of the ruling élite (defined as the internal élite) or the action 
of a decision-making élite excluded from power (defined as the external élite) as 
“reasonable” political actions. As political actions, their characteristic aim is to 
maximise their control of decision-making bodies, minimising the cost of power 
sharing with others. To do this, and reduce the competitiveness of rivals, the 
élite in power can use repressive measures or, as an alternative, can modify the 
rules of the game, e.g. change the requirements for taking part in or setting up 
decision-making bodies, the responsibilities of these bodies and their mutual 
relations. By modifying the qualifications for becoming an elector rather than a 
Member of Parliament, or modifying the powers of Parliament rather than the
3 Catalaxis in opposition to extension of costructivism (Hayek 1973-1979).
4 In the fourth chapter of my book Da sudditi a cittadini (1992) I follow the statist 
transformations of the liberal-social institutional project of the Unitarian leading class under 
pressure from hostile factors and the need to stay in power.
5 On the opportunity to give an explanatory rule to the ability of leadership to guide the 




























































































courts, the extension and impact of political rights are modified6. This is done 
with the aim of over-representing the components which are loyal to the political 
élite and under-representing the others.
We call the rules that transform political preferences into requirements to 
access to the vote or representation the rules o f translation. These govern not 
only the extension of the vote and the equality of opportunity of voters, but also 
pluralism. For example, a minimum quota of 57c, which excludes from 
representation parties which do not reach this limit, may be introduced with the 
justification that it eliminates very small parties and makes the creation of 
government majorities easier and more stable. But it is clear that this also limits 
the extension of the vote, because people who vote for small parties count as 
non voters. At the same time, this measure can be useful for eliminating 
unpleasant extremist parties or suffocating at birth rival parties which could 
become dangerous in the future. In this way, pluralism too is limited. The rules 
of the political game may also be modified with the aim of giving weight to 
bodies in which the rulers’ policies are better represented and reducing the 
power of the others, by giving greater importance to the decisions of the former 
than the latter (e.g. the decisions of the former are transmitted to the latter in a 
stricter form). We call these rules transmission rules. The control of the central 
executive over local bodies makes their vote less incisive. For example, it can 
reduce the significance of the immigrant vote by ensuring that, even when it 
exists, it is limited to the local administration. Considering that immigrants 
normally prefer left wing parties, the loss of significance of their vote could also 
be seen as a move against pluralism. If we hypothesise that the rules of the game 
and citizenship rights that follow can be aimed at altering the political 
competition in favour of some groups and the detriment of others, tlieir first 
target is pluralism.
Does the form of political rights therefore depend on the needs of the 
ruling élite? In contrast to this thesis, put forward by Rokkan and Bendix, and 
formerly by Mosca, I would suggest that there is often in fact a situation of 
competition between élites. In fact, the political game is not always in the hands 
of the ruling élite or majority, and these are not always cohesive. The changing 
of the rules is not only the effect of adaptive behaviour of the political class 
towards the environment. The rules of the game (and the citizenship rights they 
reflect) can be completely overthrown by an external élite, as demonstrated by 
the history of successful revolutions. They can also be renegotiated between the
6 It is a thesis that Rokkan too sustains in a less radical way (1970, 31) when he affirms that 
“The decision to extend suffrage has never been an answer to pressure from below: it has 
often been the result of a struggle for the influence at the top or movements attempting to 




























































































(internal and external) components of the ruling classes, as demonstrated by the 
reformist evolutions (the emancipating and conservative societal models).
We can define as “internal” and “external” those élites which respectively 
control and do not control the decisional areas. But we should add that this 
distinction is not based on a clear dichotomy, as there are various degrees of 
exclusion from power. One thing is an opposition party, however radical, 
another is an illegal party which does not even recognise the rules of the state 
and is not recognised by them7. The political classes, both internal and external 
to the decisional bodies, compete (with each other and internally) to achieve 
favourable rules of the game (e.g. the access and form of crucial decision­
making bodies, so that they can maximise their own presence in influential 
bodies, or give greater influence to bodies where they hold more power).
Nevertheless, favourable rules of the game and an appropriate form of 
political rights are not on their own enough for any élite, because power cannot 
be based only on an artificially constructed consensus. Not even an authoritarian 
government is completely free from the need for real consensus. The élite will 
therefore try to acquire sufficient support, and will do this through the 
management of social rights and through public propaganda. So social rights can 
consist of rights for citizens, but also be used as a means of manipulation for 
keeping them in subjection.
Social rights may be desired as a basis for fair translation rules, i.e. rules 
which reflect the actual political preferences of the citizens, since they help for 
example to substantiate the extension and equality of the vote, or because they 
allow the potential elector to become competent through a good education and 
independent from employees through economical security. This interpretation of 
social rights as necessary support to political rights is strong in liberal 
democratic thought. It is sufficient to recall Stuart Mill (1975/1 ed. 1861), who 
saw public education as a way emancipating the working class from the cultural 
poverty which made them politically incompetent.
But social rights can also be desired as support for strict transmission 
rules which transfer decisions from centre to periphery, and from above to 
below. Education itself constitutes an ideological instrument in the service of 
those in government, especially in authoritarian regimes, but also to some extent 
in democratic systems, where the values of the majority culture are transmitted 
through school as neutral values. Welfare can also be used as means of 
corruption and manipulation of the electorate and of dissenters. The subsidy of
7 Dahl (1966) teaches us this when he classifies the oppositions, or Rokkan (1970) when he 




























































































associations, and the delegation of certain assistance functions to the third sector 
are ways of rewarding loyal groups, but also of making some originally 
dissident groups economically dependent (Ergas, 1986).
On the whole, citizenship rights are the result of competition between 
political élites, who take rational strategic actions intended to maximise their 
power base, though subject to constraints and pressures which depend on the 
specific situation, including current values and principles. We may define this 
action as “reasonable”. 1 shall now focus on the features of the two conservative 
models, which correspond respectively to the cases of Germany and Great 
Britain.
Conservative M odels
The State-centred Conservative Model
First of all, I shall summarise the nature of the social and political rights in this 
model in relation to the three characteristics: extension, pluralism and incidence. 
In the German prototype (and the similar Austrian case) we find: an early 
introduction of the welfare state through the first system of compulsory 
insurance. Thus there was, for those times, a relatively wide range of generous 
social rights (incidence), extended to a fair number of people (extension). Social 
rights were diversified, but the providers had to accept strong state control. In 
this respect pluralism was limited, especially in relation to its autonomy.
As far as political rights are concerned, we observe an early extension of 
suffrage (in Prussia it was universal from 1867 and in the Reich from 1871) with 
a good level of extension, even though in Prussia a strong inequality of suffrage 
persisted due to representation by orders. The secret ballot fostered the 
constitution of opposition parties, but although formally there was strong 
pluralism, the oppositions were subject to police control and, at times, even 
repressive action, as they were radical.
The weakest point of this citizenship model is the low impact of political 
rights: neither the executive power, the government, the Prime Minister nor the 
Chancellor were responsible to the Parliament, and hence to the electors, but 
were nominated by the Crown, i.e. the Emperor. Weber decidedly deplored this 
form of bureaucratic government, because of its inability to innovate and adapt 
to the social change, due to its distance from an enterprise logic.
Internal cohesion and national unity was also imposed through an 




























































































nation and the rise of citizenship rights allowed a sort of trade-off between 
nationalism and liberalism, and between state and society, which was destined to 
last. Similar strategies towards disloyal organisations were in fact to be repeated 
in the future.
Bismarck adopted a strategy of direct incorporation that was intended to 
break or force into submission the “mass containers”, the new socialist and 
Catholic political organisations, and to directly address the working classes. To 
achieve this, he repressed political organisations and obliged social 
organisations to reorganise under state control, thus representing a first example 
of neo-corporatist state. “The first social security schemes introduced by 
Bismarck in Germany and by Taaffe in Austria during the 1880s succeeded in 
achieving the desired outcome of replacing forms of self-organisation at 
company level or at trade level with agencies controlled by the state, that kept 
just some autonomy” (Baubock 1991, 16). In Bismarckian Germany, as 
elsewhere, the state had to stop where organised society drew the limits, i.e. 
where it found “obstacles to penetration” (Flora 1981). Unions were able to 
resist and to keep some autonomy. For example, they opposed welfare schemes, 
because they thought they were under-represented in the system that 
administered them (Lidtke 1966, ch. 6).
Social rights financed by the state were used as a device to draw consent 
from the emerging working class organisations and to achieve political control 
of organised civil society. In fact, it is risky to leave the management of welfare 
to social groups which do not identify with the state and which have a low 
degree of loyalty. Welfare providers were destined to control huge savings and 
financial resources, which enabled them to secure people’s consent. It was thus 
unwise to assign this role to unreliable partners. Bismarck himself summed up 
this attitude neatly when he said, referring to the socialists: “If you don’t want 
chicks, you must break the eggs” (Eyck 1950, 294). Even the short colonial 
German domination followed a very repressive strategy which rewarded 
subjects only with greater administrative efficiency.
The logic of expropriating opponents’ assets was also very evident in Italy 
during the liberal period after unification. The 1890 Law concerning the Opere 
Pie (the association of Catholic charity institutions) removed social assistance 
from Church control. These institutions’ property and money were taken by the 
State, and clergymen “whose jurisdiction was over people’s souls” were 
prevented from managing public charity institutions.
The strategy of destroying an adversary’s organisation, taking its 
resources and using them to try to convert the believers by is quite common, 




























































































organisations. Thus the beginning of social legislation in Germany, going back 
to 1883 (the state funding of health insurance), was preceded by the severe Falk 
laws, which aimed to bring the Catholic Church under State control (1875- 
1876), and by the anti-socialist laws (1878), that repressed the left wing working 
organisations. In Germany, as in Italy, anti-Catholic stances were soon 
abandoned to form a common front against the “red menace". But again, as in 
Italy, none of these repressions was really successful - none of them destroyed 
the anti-regime movements, but they did have a useful function in teaching these 
to become more cautious and flexible in the future!
The policy of enhancing national power had the effect of strengthening 
state identity versus social identities (class, religion, language, region and so 
on). This last aspect of the strategy - aimed at reducing the strength and 
complexity of civil society - was reinforced by the strong role assigned to the 
Crown as a constitutionally impartial body.
We cannot define this strategy exactly as reactionary. In fact, it attacked 
on two fronts at the same time: the socialist and the very traditionalist one. It 
could count on the support of the liberal nationalist centre and of moderate 
conservative groups, such as the Bismarckian block. (Crispi’s alliances and 
strategies in Italy at that time were very similar.) It was not a pluralist model in 
the British sense, neither was it an authoritarian state on the Asian model 
(Bendix 1964; Marletti 1987), but a truly conservative state centred model. On 
account of the pattern of social relations, the leading role assigned to the 
agrarian sector and the decision-making role of the bureaucracy as opposed to 
elected politicians (Weber 1922), we can define it a state-centred conservative 
model with an authoritarian tinge. This is also because of its cultural basis, the 
primacy assigned to the state over civil society, and to monocratic bodies over 
pluralistic and elective ones.
The conservative and state-centred model tends to combine state 
privileges (take for instance the special social provisions assigned to civil 
servants) with social privileges (for landowners and important entrepreneurs) 
and tends to set up state-owned companies in order to counterbalance the power 
of private companies, when these are not considered loyal to the regime. But 
what form of the variables identified above helps to foster a conservative statist 
citizenship model?
1) Level and Form o f Domestic Political Conflict.
In this model, in countries where there is still a strong catholic presence, we 
have a persistent conflict between the Church and the State. This conflict cuts 




























































































belonging, and produces coalitions which are constantly “under siege”. The birth 
and expansion of the socialist party, earlier here (in Germany it was in 1878) 
and its anti-system nature increased the internal conflict in the country.
2) Level o f Economic Competition.
These systems are always in competition, because they belong to the second 
phase of industrialisation. There is state engagement in the economy, both 
through protectionist measures, and direct intervention in the national economy, 
of which welfare policies represent only a part. It is necessary to add that, unlike 
Italy, these economies were "up and running”, as they had to be wealthy enough 
to be able to extract funds for the Sozialstaat and advanced enough, under the 
administrative point of view, to impose taxation and provide services. Italy did 
not meet these requirements when a statist strategy of direct incorporation was 
tried by Francesco Crispi, an admirer of Bismarck. Economic backwardness and 
administrative inefficiency help to explain the reluctance of the young Italian 
State to introduce social security (Paci 1984). The institutional conservatism, 
about which we will say more when analysing the cultural variables, and the 
need to establish a more competitive economy, led to an excessive exploitation 
of the workforce (Rokkan 1970), and favoured the rise of anti-system 
opposition. When the internal élite closes up, the external élite cannot remain 
open either. The radical attitude of external élite in Germany was due non only 
to the attitude of its counterpart, but also to the timing of the birth of a national 
working class party. The countries which were latecomer in this respect tend to 
have more radical workers’ associations which are not in tune with the context, 
since their demands are imitated from the countries with more advanced 
economies. In the less advanced countries, labour productivity must be kept high 
in order to catch up with the leading economies, therefore demands that would 
raise the cost of labour are unlikely to be accepted. In this situation, protests are 
easily channelled into strongly antagonistic, anti-system organisations 8. It then 
becomes necessary to reaffirm the authority of the state or crown, to attempt to 
destroy the unloyal mass organisations and buy the consensus of their members9.
8 These countries are often latecomers not only economically but politically too, so their 
regimes have not yet overcome the legitimisation crisis. This allows the spread of an 
opposition culture that wants to overthrow the government.
9 These are situations and strategic moves that often occur in emergent stages of the working 
mass movements. In some countries, the containment strategies take on softer forms: the 
repressive strategy is entirely or partially replaced by the authoritative paternalism of the 
conservative mass parties. This is the case of the promoters of social monarchy, the Tory 
movement which in Italy finds Sidney Sonnino as is the most important supporter. The 
Bismarckian version is certainly more authoritative that the English one. The fact is that the 





























































































3) Level of International Conflict.
While the construction of national unity is achieved by conquest or as a result of 
a hostile international climate, authoritarian or statist features tend to be imposed 
from the beginning. An example is offered by the behaviour of the German 
liberals, who renounced the parliamentary principle desired for the new regime 
in order to offer a compact front against the forces hostile to national unification 
in the Frankfurt Diet (1848). Germany was unified through three wars: the first 
in 1864 against Denmark, the second in 1866 against Austria and the third in 
1870 against France. Italian liberals and democrats, too, adapted their 
institutional ideals in order to make unification possible in a hostile 
environment, but conceded less than the Germans to authoritarian statism. The 
exaltation of national unity and pressure on industry coexist in wartime. It is not 
a coincidence that the uniformity of political rights (extension of suffrage) and 
relative uniformity of social rights (first compulsory and subsidised insurance, 
then national insurance) tend to be introduced after or during periods of conflict 
(Middlemas, 1979, Therbom, 1977). These concessions are also useful to 
compensate citizens for the personal risks and difficulties implied by the state of 
war and to prevent mass desertion. Bismarck considered universal suffrage to be 
“a weapon in the battle against Austria and the other foreign countries” 
(Therbom 1977,22).
4) Breadth and Power o f Dominant Coalitions.
The bilateral opposition from the Catholic Zentrum, on the one side, and the 
socialists, on the other, weakened the internal élite, de-legitimising it as a 
coalition. Religious cleavage broke both upper and lower class alignments and 
prevented any kind of hegemonic coalition. The weakness of coalitions explains 
statism, i.e. the need to make use of the strength of the state to enforce power. 
The social coalition that supports the regime was dominated by land-owners, 
which explains the conservative nature of German statism.
5) Culture o f Ruling Elite and Conception o f Citizenship.
In the German political culture, traditional sources of power legitimisation were 
abandoned later than elsewhere. By contrast, the conception of a State which has 
leading functions in relation to civil society came earlier. These principles were 
synergetic. The central role of the Crown, its hereditary character and the 
principle of divine investiture, according to which the Kaiser derived his power 
from God and not from man, emancipated public hierarchies from civil society. 
The hegelian conception of the state and the public arena as spheres which 
produce a superior ethic, detached from the petty individual, familial or 





























































































The State and the public sphere were places where women could not 
enter. It was held that the emotionally-involved, family-focused woman would 
never be able to transcend her private life, to deserve the membership of a 
superior order, and would never be a citizen. In conservative thought, the 
paternal state reflects the virtues of the family, where hierarchies are respected, 
quarrels banned, for the sake of achieving the common good. Conservative 
statism invades and transcends the family - those who remain in its web are 
limited to an inferior spiritual and political level. We only have to think of the 
hegelian view of the constitutional state and the influence this had on later 
public rights in Germany: on the on hand, the dislike for particularism, for the 
late feudalism that the parliamentary structure was supposed to represent; and on 
the other, the task of creating order in civil society, given to the state, and the 
definition of its bureaucrats as a “universal class”. Society was not supposed to 
be pluralist, but organic, the parts had to co-operate and overcome partiality in 
the name of the general interest, represented only by the state. For Hegel, state 
and government should absorb and raise to their highest level the principle of 
the family: “the same unity, which bonds the family with a sentiment of love, is 
the essence of the State (...). The living totality, the conservation, so to say, the 
continuous production of the State in general is the government. The necessary 
organization at the natural level is given by the coming up of the family and of 
the civil society. The government is the general part of the community, the part 
which has as intentional aim the preservation of other parts, and which both 
conceives and applies the universal aims of the whole (Hegel, 1878, II, 403 and 
409). From this, it followed that women, being absorbed in the natural 
organisation (the “family”), would not be able to rise to the public sphere when 
this meant leaving behind those predilections and affections which could distract 
from the search for the general interest. As Carla Lonzi effectively observed 
about Hegel, he rationalised, more insidiously than others, about patriarchal 
power in the dialectic between a divine female principle and a human male 
principle. The former shapes the family, the latter the community:
“As the community gives itself its means of existence through the destruction of 
family bliss and the dissolution of individual self-conscience in the universal self­
conscience, it identifies as its internal enemy that which is at the same time necessary 
and oppressive: femininity in general. Woman does not invade the subjective level: 
identifying herself in the family, in relatives and in blood ties (...), she lacks the 
conditions to emancipate herself from the family ethos and rejoin the self-conscious 
form of universality through which man becomes citizen.”




























































































"The feminine condition which is the result of the oppression, is indicated bv Hegel as
the very reason of the oppression" (Lonzi. 1970. 25).
From this theoretical premise, according to which women were supposed to be 
absorbed in the family, comes the legal measures which tied women to the 
family and ensured the division of roles was fully respected. And this was true 
not only for the pre-liberal authoritarian regimes, but also for the post-liberal, 
fascist regime, where the woman was relegated to her duties and male 
predominance in the family restored. Even today, countries with a statist matrix 
(France and Germany) tend to protect maternity more than the countries of 
conservative societal origin, but they also tend to consider fathers as responsible 
for their children and entitled to family allowances (Wennemo 1994).
Hegel's conception of the State -  as correctly observed by Sabine (1964)- 
closely fits a form of nationalism in which it is a function of the state to foster 
industry and trade as part of its general mission to extend the national power. It 
was in Germany that the main school of criticism of the market economy, the 
institutional economy, was bom. In the statist syndrome, cultural variables 
combine with economic variables. In Italy, it is in fact in the areas with the least 
advanced economies and civil context, the Southern regions, that hegelian 
philosophy flourishes (Romanelli, 1979). Politicians of southern origin, like 
Crispi, were the ones who fostered some kind of statist model, and who ended 
up by applying a direct integration strategy, i.e. a little welfare and the 
repression of the opposition. Furthermore, the external elite’s culture oscillated, 
in Italy as well as in Germany, between theoretical revolutionarism, which 
relegated it to the role of an anti-system force, and accommodating behaviour 
which reduced the efficacy of its subversive power (Salvadori 1981, 3-48). 
Legien’s unionist reformist model was, as we shall see, to find a more coherent 
application in the Swedish case than in its native Germany.
The German conception of citizenship is typical of a “nation in search of a 
state”. It grew up alongside the movements for unification and has gradually 
gathered strength. It is an ethnic, volkish, conception: being part of the state 
depends on sharing traditions, of belonging to one people (Brubaker, 1992). 
Prussia (like Denmark) first adopted a jus soli principle for the acquisition of 
nationality, it introduced jus sanguinis in 1843 and reinforced the principle in 
1913, when the country perceived itself as a country of emigration. Citizenship 
by descent became dominant, underlining the country’s reluctance to naturalise 
foreigners, such as immigrants from Poland. Since then, the jus sanguinis has 
persisted even in democratic Germany after the war, and begun to be discussed 




























































































If our general thesis on the statist model is right, this model should be 
found in contexts of political conflict (not only at internal, but also international 
conflict), and in weak economies struggling to catch up with stronger ones, or 
strong economies in recession. In support of this thesis is the fact that economic 
protectionism and the introduction of social rights appeared in Germany after 
the first electoral success of the socialists (internal conflict) and the economic 
crisis in the 1880s (loss of competitiveness) (Leon 1980), and as support in the 
attempt to catch up with the British economy. If we wish to interpret the Italian 
case in terms of citizenship typologies, we can consider the liberal phase as a 
societal project in a context which gradually turned into a more statist model, as 
the annexations continued towards the South. In general terms, after unification 
Italy was backward even from a statist point of view -  there was a religious 
cleavage, worsened by the presence on national territory of the hostile Vatican 
state, and like in Germany, an attempt (though weaker and with a greater delay) 
to catch up with the first-wave industrialised countries. Finally, there was a 
young and less efficient bureaucracy.
In the period immediately after unification, the ideology of the liberal élite 
- mainly from Northern and North Central regions like Piedmont, Lombardy, 
Emilia Romagna and Tuscany - was essentially societal. Their initial intentions 
in setting up the institutional profiles of the new state was societal -  this clearly 
emerges when we analyse the bills of law and constitutional projects - but they 
had to come to terms with a hostile opposition, and were forced to adopt a weak 
statist model (Zincone 1992, chap. IV).
The Societal Conservative Model.
When we observe an example of the societal conservative model, like liberal 
Great Britain, we notice that the vote expressed by organised civil society gives 
legitimisation to and actually decides the composition of the main decision­
making body (the House of Commons). Even though non-elective bodies - such 
as the House of Lords and the Crown - still retain certain responsibilities and 
powers, these were already declining in the liberal period, i.e. the historical case 
we are taking into consideration. Relative to its time, the political rights impact 
of this model scores high. To avoid the disruptive consequences of suffrage with 
high impact, the extension was selected, filtered and diluted through time10.
10 In Italy the limited extension of suffrage lowered the impact of the Parliamentary system. 
Furthermore, the voluntary abstention from the vote of the ’disloyal’Catholic electorate and a 
share of leftist voters limited the consequences of a high impact. The Liberal élite enjoyed an 





























































































We have defined as rules o f translation those rules that transform social 
features (income, gender, education, place) into entitlements to vote and be 
represented. In societal conservative systems, these rules transform into voters 
only social strata that have acquired some social dignity and political reliability. 
In practice, this meant that voters usually made up between one and three per 
cent of the population (Liberal Britain was a positive exception, reaching eight 
per cent after the Reform Act in 1832). So, a typical feature of these models is 
the low extension of political rights. However, the closer the fit of the case to the 
model, the higher the impact. After the electoral reform of 1867. Disraeli 
introduced the convention of resigning after losing the elections, without waiting 
for a vote of no confidence in Parliament. The British Cabinet hence became 
directly responsible to the electorate. By contrast, in the German prototype, 
Bismarck did not resign even when he had patently lost Parliament''s confidence 
(Eyck 1950; Gall 1982). The societal conservative model is based on limited 
extension but high incidence of political rights. Its pluralism also scored quite 
high, as the competition between parties was relatively fair. This was possible 
because there were no strong anti-system revolutionary parties or movements. 
Pluralism was easily achieved between similar creeds and friendly movements.
In this model there was a gradual acceptance of selected groups of civil 
society" as full citizens with political rights. Low conflict favoured contractual 
attitudes and agreements on fundamentals. Elites already in power and those out 
of power were ready to agree on the exclusion of “inadequate classes and 
genders”. Apart from the Chartist movement, even working class organisations 
in Britain did not ask for universal suffrage. They shared with the ruling elite a 
“capacitarian” interpretation of citizenship (Dunbabin 1986, 122) based on the 
assumption that not everyone is able to be a citizen or elector, and that this 
ability, or “capacity”, should be proved by industrious activity in the economic 
area. Societal conservative systems usually adopt criteria of wealth (a given 
level of income, possession of real estate or rented property) or of “merit” (the 
level of education or kind of profession). Both types of criteria are supposed to 
reflect independence and competence, indicating the subject’s adequacy to enter 
the public sphere. In this model, also the external élite accepts these principles 
and is aware of the risk of accepting easily manipulated masses into the public 
sphere.
" This type has something in common with that built by Eisenstadt (1965) in which he 
classifies the countries influenced by the British model, such the United States, the 
Dominions (Canada, Australia and New Zealand) as countries able to integrate the lower 
classes before they became politically active. In fact they had solved state-building and the 




























































































Political rights in this model are not bestowed, but given under pressure. 
Extension of suffrage is due to the mobilisation of the potential beneficiary. This 
can be considered an indicator of a strong and vital civil society, which is a 
precondition for the model to rise and become established. Goodhart and 
Hanbury (1952, 245) referring to the period before the 1832 Reform Act wrote: 
“turmoils were spread in the main cities, the situation in Bristol was dramatic. 
Political associations and reformers groups activities made it clear that if the bill 
were not to pass soon, civil war could explode”. The situation was very similar 
in 1867, when, as Harrison remarked (1965, 132), “The presence of the Reform 
League stopped the recurrent trick of withdrawing at the last moment”. The fear 
that the meeting to be held on May 6th in Hyde Park could degenerate was the 
deterrent that pushed Parliament to decide. This third extension was spurred by 
the mine workers mobilisation for the vote in Scotland, which led to the 1884 
Reform.
But, as Marshall too pointed out, this is not a general pattern. The 
extension of suffrage is not always a consequence of pressure or moves from 
below as shown by Italian experience in the last century. In 1869, the Italian 
Minister of the Interior asked Prefects and Provincial Delegates whether it 
would be appropriate to extend the right to a local vote. The answer was that it 
was impossible to register the least interest in voting among the population 
(Romanelli 1983), even from those already with the right to vote.
The extension of rights resulting from demands or moves from below (on 
behalf of new citizens or organisations), rather than strategies or moves from 
above (interested concessions by those in power), constitutes another important 
distinction between statist and societal models. Even though strategies from 
above are present in all models, demands for inclusion are stronger in the 
societal models. In these, unlike the statist models, moves from below take the 
form of requests, as opposed to revolutionary movements.
The input-output mechanism is a good way of representing societal 
models. The movement for women’s suffrage, for instance, are typical of 
countries with a societal tradition, as well as movements supporting civil and 
political rights for minorities. By contrast, in countries with a statist tradition, 
the vote was given to women mainly to swamp the red electorate. The same can 
be said about the early introduction of universal suffrage, which in these regimes 
was used to “dilute” the industry workers vote with the vote of the easily 
manipulated country workers.
The same mechanism is also responsible for producing social rights. In 
Great Britain the state intervened relatively late in funding welfare programs. 




























































































Liberals in 1906 to launch a programme of social security . The state 
contribution to social security (unemployment allowances) dates from the same 
year.
The demand for rights has a relatively compact and homogeneous 
character: representatives of the excluded groups tend to accept the rules of the 
game, both political and social.
Great Britain fits with Marshall’s hypothesis also from the point of view 
of the sequence of introduction of citizenship rights. The extension of an 
“incisive” vote to industrial workers preceded the construction of the welfare 
state. The first relevant law, the National Insurance Act, providing insurance 
against unemployment and illness through a triple contribution system came in 
1911, the first state contribution for pensions in only 1925. This makes welfare 
appear as the outcome of the labour party’s electoral competition but, as we saw 
when illustrating the conservative statist model, this thesis does not apply 
everywhere.
To be more precise, we should not depict the societal situation as hyper- 
consensual and hyper-articulated. For instance, there is not always a strict 
correspondence between union demands and social legislation - unions 
sometimes “resisted” state intervention12 3. But, as demonstrated by Heclo (1974), 
there was a close relationship between the contents of socialist programmes and 
the contents of the law, i.e. between articulated requests and concessions. In 
liberal Great Britain, the classic request-response model is not so far from 
political reality as elsewhere. For instance, the minority report on the Poor Law, 
presented by the Webbs in 1909, summarised the future programme of British 
welfare.
The case of liberal Britain fits the societal model well also as far the 
management of welfare is concerned. Welfare came late, and the extension and 
incidence of the social rights are low if we compare the country’s level of 
economic development with statist cases. Autonomy and differentiation rates are 
high, and pluralism is respected both in social and political rights. For similar 
reasons, oppositions were accepted because they were moderate; welfare and 
education were the responsibility of civil society organisations because these 
were loyal to the government. It is important to specify that societal regimes 
adopt an indirect form o f government - they do not act directly, but delegate 
many public functions. This devolution tends to take extreme forms in
12 After the debated Unemployed Workmen Act of 1905.
13 On the origins of the British welfare state and the role played by the organised working 




























































































education: in fact, for a long time, the English prototype limited its action to the 
subsidy of religious organisations.
The first law, which granted an endowment of twenty thousand pounds to 
the two principal school associations - the National Society (Church of England) 
and the British and Foreign School Society (non conformist) -  dates back to 
1833 and took until 1872 for Great Britain to introduce compulsory public 
education. According to some critics of the British welfare model, the country 
paid for this delay, resulting from a typical societal attitude, in terms of 
economic development14.
It should be pointed out that this delegation of education was made only to 
the officially accepted, loyal confessions. No Catholic nor Jewish schools were 
financed, since these religions were considered disloyal and detrimental to 
liberal regimes; they were “emancipated” and given civil rights only in 1824. 
Respect for the autonomy of civil society applied to only part of that society: the 
part that was perceived as homogeneous to the ruling class.
Societal systems can arise in countries where the state is able to disband 
its prime enemy, Catholic Church, at an early stage. Societal Britain is the only 
non authoritarian state with its own Church and Monarch to head it. As for 
education, the management social security too was delegated, in this case to 
Friendly Societies. These mutual help societies covered those in the working 
class who earned enough to save the money needed to contribute. Autonomy 
was combined with differentiation, to the detriment of extension and equality. 
The success of the Friendly Societies, which accumulated an incredible amount 
of small savings, i.e. their relatively high incidence, was due at least in part to 
fear of the workhouse. But the system adopted in Speenhamland, which had 
been extended country-wide since 1795 and which guaranteed a minimum living 
wage (for instance by integrating salaries), was dismantled in 1834 under 
pressure from free-marketeers and replaced by the Poor Law, that allowed the 
reclusion of the needy in workhouses. These were effectively prisons, where the 
inmates were obliged to wear uniforms, were not allowed to receive visitors, and 
women were separated from men. As the report of the committee chaired by 
Bentham stated, “every penny spent to make the situation of a poor person 
preferable to that of a worker is an incentive to indolence and vice”. People who 
“enjoyed” public assistance lost their civil and political rights. The law was in 
force until 1918 in Britain and 1934 in Iceland.
14 1 should like to thank Professor Zeitlin for our conversation on the evolution of the British 




























































































The little public assistance and social citizenship we find in liberal 
regimes was offered in exchange for political and sometimes even some civil 
rights. The citizen had to be an economically independent person. In this model, 
the dependence of citizenship on features and abilities demonstrated at the social 
level is complete.
Rights were the spontaneous result of natural qualities and endeavour. But 
we know that liberal regimes cheated, since in order to prove that some groups 
were not fit for citizenship, they wee prevented from entering social 
competition. Women, for instance, could not show their performance in business 
or in school, since they did not enjoy legal rights (for example, they could not 
sign contracts) and were excluded from higher education. In Great Britain, the 
civil service opened its ranks to women in 1855, but only for the lowest jobs, 
and not until 1870 were they admitted as employees. Lawyers’ and doctors' 
associations wanted universities to be closed to females, and when women were 
admitted, they restricted entry to their professional registers. In general, the 
higher their status, the longer the higher education establishments and 
professions resisted. English universities began opening their doors to women 
around the mid century, but Oxford and Cambridge were the last to cede. Even 
in an area where Britain was a forerunner, the laws for the protection of workers, 
which forbade women and children to do certain jobs and work long hours, were 
in one sense a way of limiting unfair competition from cheap labour, avoiding 
competition with the more valuable work of men and reinforcing the idea that 
women were not suited to a role in production and, hence, to become citizens. 
Women could be protected at work because they were not citizens (Marshall, 
1990; led. 1950, p.15).
The economic independence and political competence which were 
supposed to distinguish the good liberal citizen were precluded to women on the 
basis of pre-social considerations, due to their weak physical and intellectual 
make-up or on the grounds of considerations contrasting with the liberal 
pluralism. Whereas public order could admit a multiplicity of opinions, 
economic order could admit competition between producers and workers, family 
order was based on the dominance of men over women. The acceptance of 
components which, as Locke states, legitimated liberal institutions, was 
superfluous in the institution of the family (Schochet 1969, 93). On the contrary, 
there it was necessary for somebody to rule! As stated by Locke (1948, II, 82, 
297): “But the husband and wife, though they have but one concern, yet having 
different understandings, will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too. It 
therefore being necessary that the last determination (i.e., the rule) should be 
placed somewhere, it naturally falls to the man’s share, as the abler and stronger 
part”. In this way, the liberal principle which says “all individuals are by nature 




























































































diversity of nature is found, too strong not to be taken into consideration when 
political rights are decided.
Public culture praised the sphere of production as opposed to the sphere of 
reproduction, but women were secluded in the reproductive sphere and kept 
away from productive activity. Even in the reproductive sphere, as in the family 
in general, women did not have rights: family possessions belonged to men. and 
in the case of separation, the custody of children was usually granted to the 
father. Similarly wages, salary and any income of a married woman (even when 
she was separated) were administered by her husband. Feminine citizenship was 
an indirect one. As Vogel (1989, 11) observes, quoting Atkins and Hoggett, 
(1984, ch. 9 and 10): “With regard to nationality, residence, responsibility of the 
children, taxes, pensions etc., the rights and the duties of a married woman are 
kept still in the subordinated and defined state of wife. For example, we have to 
wait till 1898 for the British government to propose a revision of the fiscal laws 
which treated the married woman as a real estate property of the husband.”
Up to recent times, and sometimes even now, conservative societal 
countries have followed a strategy of supporting “family income” earned by the 
father (Orloff, 1996 a, b), thus reinforcing the traditional family model in which 
the father works and earns outside the family and the mother takes care of the 
family. The commitment to a male breadwinner - and female housewife - has to 
be considered (Lewis, 1992) a crucial element in distinguishing between 
conservative and emancipating welfare regimes15. According to liberal creed, 
merit should emerge from civil society, project itself on the state and shape it. In 
fact merit is produced by public action aimed at protecting the groups already 
dominant, in terms of gender, class, religion and culture.
Summing up, this model gives political rights with high incidence, good 
pluralism, but a limited extension; and offers social citizenship again with low 
extension, but with a high level of incisiveness. There is high differentiation of 
the political offer and autonomy of social rights providers. But competition ad 
incisiveness, diversification and autonomy are reserved for those organizations, 
classes, cultures and gender which are part of the dominant social coalition. This 
is why we define this model a “societal conservative” one: it can be very tough 
on the weak and very soft with the strong. This also applies to contemporary 
regimes or governmental majorities which are inspired by this model. But, with 
time, the stronger groups, i.e. those who are included, can become very wide and 
transform this into an emancipating societal model. I will now illustrate in a
15 Lewis’ criterion was considered insufficient by Orloff (1996a) because he did not consider 





























































































more systematic way the factors which may help explain the birth of the model.
1 ) Level and Form o f domestic political conflict.
The competition within each élite (internal and external élite) may be greater 
than the competition between government and opposition, giving place to 
bipartisan alliances and to quite a low level of political conflict. To some extent, 
the low political conflict is due to a low level of social conflict: the peaks of 
fighting occurred previously and were contained by early and effective 
repression (Moore, 1966; Bendix, 1980). The low level of conflict makes it 
possible to let opponents gradually enter the decision-making arenas and to 
delegate some social security and educational tasks to civil society organisations 
which do not strongly oppose the Government majority, even though they may 
not back it. An opening towards the opposition implies a willingness to risk: 
new movements are not repressed, because the ruling élite sees a lack of danger 
from them (as Bismarck might have put it. the eggs are allowed to open since 
the new chickens are not foreseen to be dangerous!). But the acceptance of risk 
is not only because it is seen to be slight. In liberal regimes, as in the later 
liberal-democrats ones, the alarm caused by conflict, and the consequent 
repression of the political opposition, is triggered at higher thresholds.
The conservative societal model takes on a specific form in the case of 
strong cultural and linguistic cleavages which have overcome their “physical 
fight” phase. It gives way to a societal subtype that we can define 
communitarian or multicultural model. This is the case of the genetic phase in 
the Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium. Here we still find a Parliamentary 
Government in early stages and consequently a high incidence of the political 
rights that can “control” the government. In Belgium and the Netherlands, 
though not in Switzerland (Huard, 1986, 291), we also find limited suffrage (so 
sometimes low extension) for longer than in Great Britain. The pluralism rate is 
high, but the electoral competition is “defensive” (Sani and Sartori, 1982; Koole 
and van Praag, 1990), i.e. aimed at preserving each cultural reservoir. The 
electoral results have long been deprived of importance because governments 
are supported by wide coalitions: losing the elections does not mean a party 
necessarily loses power if it can rely on sufficient alliances.
For authors such as Lijphart (1984) the most important distinction in 
contemporary democratic models is between the majority type (where 
competing parties alternatively make up the government) and the consociative 
type ( where governments include almost all the principal parties). It seems to 
me, however, that the most important point of distinction is the role attributed to 
the state as opposed to civil society, and that its “cultural fragmentation” can be 




























































































In Belgium and the Netherlands social security too was introduced late. In 
the beginning, there was relatively low extension, combined with a good 
incidence (for those categories which could take advantage of state-funded 
mutual aid societies). There is also high autonomy and a high differentiation of 
social rights. In the Netherlands as well as in Belgium, "The sub-cultural 
segmentation delayed the introduction of the compulsory public security, but 
solicited instead the public subsidy to the volunteer mutual societies and to the 
sub-cultural assistance structures” (Ferrera 1993, 144).
The introduction of a liberal regime is extremely difficult in a context of 
really high conflict, of high polarization. This was the case in Italy, where 
practically none of the environmental conditions favorable to a societal model 
were present, apart from the will and the culture of the ruling liberal élites, who 
were in fact obliged to revise their plans, introducing heavy elements of 
statalism (Zincone, 1992, ch. IV). The Italian case remains one of weak 
statalism, because it is driven by circumstances, and (even more than Germany) 
opposed by the presence of the Catholic Church and its organizations in civil 
society. In fact, the two following extreme conservative statist models, Italian 
Fascism and German Nazism, had very different relations with the Church. The 
Italian Concordato gave a special status to the Church and a certain degree of 
autonomy to its organisations.
2) Level o f Economical Competition.
Social and political contractualism is also rooted in the economic sphere. Both 
the societal and the private path to welfare, as well as the strategy of opening of 
decisional arenas to the opposition, may be adopted because the economy offers 
room for manoeuvre - for instance, salaries can be raised because of a 
favourable position in international markets. The financial surplus can be used to 
satisfy the stronger strata of the working class through concessions bargained for 
at collective or individual level. A successful economy - as observed by Sombart 
(1976/1906) in relation to industrial workers in the United States -  gives the 
working class stronger bargaining power in conditions of scarcity of labour, 
increasing salaries, giving better opportunities for private and societal savings 
and imposing more limits on exploitation, i.e. a sort of “spontaneous” welfare 
comes into existence. Spontaneous private welfare also covers the most 
privileged part of the working class. It is the “exclusive” character of both 





























































































3) Level o f International Conflict.
The acceptance of different parties, factions and interests, which is essential to 
the indirect strategy of political integration and societal political representation, 
is possible when there is no serious external conflict that makes it necessary to 
subordinate group interests or internal divides to the national interest. This is the 
case of countries or historical phases16 where the myth of unity or national 
strength prevails over social belonging, but where social belongings and divides 
do not challenge the bonds of loyalty towards the state. Such countries have 
found institutional arrangements of a pluralist type provide a solution to civil, 
religious and regional wars, before class fights arise. In these situations it is not 
necessary to reinforce public loyalty through uniform citizenship rights. But 
again we find the variable of the geopolitical situation: as an island, the security 
of its frontiers against even strong neighbours was important for Great Britain, 
just as for Germany the uncertainty and vulnerability of its own frontiers to 
strong and aggressive neighbours was an important factor. Britain was already a 
great colonial power, and its domination had been increasingly consolidated 
during the liberal period. What is more, the theatre of battle was far away and 
did not affect the population directly.
4) Breadth and Power o f Dominant Coalitions
The coalitions which hold the decision-making arenas are wide enough (in terms 
of control of resources) and have sufficient authority (in terms of legitimisation) 
to afford a strategy of co-option of the elite of emerging social groups. In these 
conditions it was possible to set up a relatively pluralist institutional framework. 
Nevertheless, the consensual co-option mechanism weakened the impact of the 
working class organisations, so social relations and hierarchies were not 
drastically transformed. “Great Britain was perhaps able to do something new, 
but always in the same old way” (Ashford, 1986, 63). The conservative 
connotation applies obviously only to the liberal phase, but the recent Thatcher 
period and Mr. Blair’s “friendly to capital” socialism could indicate a tendency 
of the pendulum to go back to the original position of societal conservative 
when allowed to.
16 I am referring to historical phases, because Great Britain was involved in both European 
and World Wars, and underwent an economic and colonial challenge in the 1880s that 
justified Chamberlain’s request for a “new empire” that was protectionist and generous in 




























































































In this type of system we find a political culture which legitimates the 
consent of civil society as the only source of power. As Locke stated (1948/11 
ed. 1690, 212) in The Two Treaties o f Government, “by the consent and 
appointment of the people, without which no one man, or number of men among 
them, can have authority of making laws that shall be binding for the rest”. As 
civil society cannot be but pluralistic, it is a political system which accepts 
pluralism and the distribution of power existing at the civil society level, hosting 
this pluralism and distribution of power within the political bodies. But it 
expects from those who want to be citizens to demonstrate their ability as 
private individuals. The liberal Constant wrote: “In our societies the birth in the 
country and the maturity of age are not enough to confer to men the typical 
qualities needed to practice political rights. Those who are kept by misery in a 
continuous dependence and condemned to everyday labour are not more 
enlightened than children about public affairs, nor more interested than 
foreigners in a national prosperity whose elements they do not know and whose 
advantages they enjoy only indirectly” (Constant, 1970a/I ed. 1818, 100). We 
have already pointed out however that the chance to demonstrate ability and 
independence, which entitled people to full access to citizenship were legally 
denied to women, and concretely denied to the poor, for whom no public 
intervention was organised to emancipate them materially and culturally. 
Society is also made up of inadequate and unsuccessful people, were kept away 
from citizenship. The same tolerance towards religious minorities, introduced in 
Britain before elsewhere (with the Indulge Act of 1698) was reserved for 
deserving denominations, and until 1824, following Milton and Locke’s advice, 
did not include the Catholic and Hebrew minorities, as they were guilty for not 
prizing enough the individual spiritual freedom that produces good citizens. The 
same judgement of inadequacy applied to foreign civil societies justified the 
colonial government which recognised local authorities only if they accept 
dependent political status (Segatori, 1996).
In this political culture, civil society nourishes the state, and civil society 
spontaneously produces its own elite. By contrast, a statist culture perceives the 
artificial and arbitrary nature of the social order and proposes to amend it 
through public rationality. In its emancipating version, the destruction of the 
artificial political and social order is thought to enable the human race to 
reacquire its profound nature (consider Rousseau or Marx). Societal culture, on 
the other hand, fears far-ranging rational intervention, believing in spontaneity, 
to the extent - as in the British case - of not having a written constitution, but 
basing the rules of government on customs and convention in order to leave 
space for rights derived from the stratification over time of interpretations and 
sentences of the authorities (common law). Great Britain does not have a real




























































































legal conception of citizenship, intended as the belonging of a citizen endowed 
with inalienable rights to a State which has jurisdiction over a territory. In the 
past, the relationship between people and political power was not related to the 
territory and state, but was a relationship firstly between the subject and the 
Crown, and then between the subject and the Parliament. Those relationships 
were very different. Modem judicial citizenship, intended as a uniform legal 
status, was introduced only in very recent times as a reaction to immigration 
(Layton-Henry, 1992; Juss, 1993; Dummett, 1997) and is distinguished more by 
the denial of rights to aliens than as an instrument for establishing citizens' 
rights. Paradoxically, some categories of subjects, defined by the 1981 Law, 
enjoy the status of citizen - British Nationals Overseas, Residents in British 
Dependent Territories - but are denied the right to enter Britain and reside in the 
national territory. To these people, as to British Subjects deprived of citizenship 
status, the right to vote is granted once they are allowed to enter and reside in 
Britain. The British differentiation of rights is extreme, because it affects even 
the status of citizen.
In the conservative societal model, the State does not create citizens nor 
treat them as equals, but simply registers -in its public rhetoric - existing 
diversities. Civil society spontaneously produces a well balanced equilibrium of 
powers, the State must just accept it: its direct role is minimum. The same logic 
presides over the ruling of colonies: here again the government rules indirectly, 
delegates at least a share of its duties to local powers: this is the Indirect Rule 
theorised by Lord Lugart. The very origins of the British Empire, as those of 
another conservative societal regime (the Netherlands, for instance), can be 
found in the economic activities of the Chartered Companies. British colonial 
regimes, like those of the Netherlands and Belgium ( at least after the end of the 
personal property of the Crown) are extremely diversified, as well as relatively 
autonomous. In India, the states of Rajastan depended on London only for the 
so-called suzerainety, for foreign policy. They had their own armies and 
administration, and the government of the Crown was present only through the 
person of a “resident”; by contrast, the protectorates did not have armies of their 
own. The status of the dominions, acquired first by Canada, in 1867, consisted 
of being federated to the Crown, not depending on the British Government. The 
more the liberal principle of responsible government (according to which a 
government should respond to its subjects) became established, the more the 
status of dominion was extended to other countries.
Bryce (1907, 37) underlined interesting similarities between the Roman 
and the British Empire. Neither interfered with local religions and customs 
unless they raised moral conflicts; both had an increasing devolution of 
sovereignty and a gradual evolution towards an autonomous union under the 





























































































If these theses on the societal model are grounded, we should detect a 
decrease in the tendency to delegate sovereignty or welfare functions when the 
organisations involved become more radical. We should also detect a deflection 
away from the non intervention in the economy in the case of a loss of 
hegemony in international markets, and a shift towards statist characters in the 
case of war. Even without a systematic empirical survey, the British case would 
seem to give some evidence to support our hypothesis. Welfare management 
was put under state control only when it risked getting into radical hands. There 
was a shift towards a statist attitude after the rise of the German and US 
economies and the comparative deceleration of Great Britain in primis (Leon 
1980, I, vol.IV, 118ss). The First World War fostered, also in societal Britain, 
the public care of citizens’ health and the setting up of kindergartens relieved 
working women, needed for war production, of the care of small children 
(McNeill 1984, 272-275). The Beveridge plan, which introduced a national 
social security system for all citizens, was planned and announced at the end of 
the Second World War. Similar evidence from communitarian societal systems 
(Belgium, Holland, Switzerland) indicates that in wartime these become more 
statist, shifting towards a less delegated and more equal system of welfare.
But where does Italy stand in relation to the two conservative models? 
The initial societal culture (Marucco 1980) and the relations between State and 
Church, with alternating head on fights and reciprocal admissions of weakness 
gave way to partial delegation of social security, contrasted by recurrent waves 
of expropriation. Nevertheless, for welfare state building, the Italian liberal State 
not only lacked a coherent culture, but also the necessary administrative and 
fiscal structure. Societal projects were abandoned because the context was 
inadequate, but a real statist project was never fully adopted either, partly 
because it was incoherent with the dominant ideological values of the regime, 
and partly because of structural deficiencies. Fascism adopted a clearly 
authoritarian version of the conservative statist model: civil society
organisations were not only bypassed and sometimes temporarily repressed, as 
had happened in the authoritarian phases of the Liberal regime, but organisations 
generated from civil societies were destroyed and replaced by artificial ones 
create from above. This is the core of the corporative authoritarian model 
(Aquarone 1965, Fisichella 1976, Tranfaglia 1973). In this model, admission to 
social security is made dependent on loyalty to the regime. Even the status of 
citizen was linked to one’s political beliefs and could be withdrawn for reasons 
of public order. In authoritarian regimes, the relationship between rights and 
loyalty is explicit and absolute, showing how the truth of a democracy depends 
on the fact that its rights are independent from opinions and political belongings, 




























































































The Fascist regime in Italy left an important part of the management ol 
welfare and education to the Catholic Church, because of a compromise between 
State and Church, and the consequent formal loyalty of the Church to the 
regime. But devolution did not affect politically crucial functions, such as 
political socialisation. The autonomy of young people's Catholic associations, 
due to their potential for dissent as a sphere of socialisation, became one of the 
reasons for the conflict between political and religious hierarchies. The Fascist 
regime emerged in Italy after the failure of the attempt at direct integration made 
by Francesco Crispi at the end of the 19th century. Crispi had also introduced 
some elements of a welfare system, but this was very limited because it 
depended on limited financial means. Giovanni Giolitti at the beginning of the 
20th century and before the first World War also tried a strategy of indirect 
integration and introduced further elements of welfare, bargaining with the 
socialist opposition. The Fascist direct authoritarian integration made an 
exception (an exception for authoritarian regimes, not for fascist ones), granting 
indirect integration towards Catholic organisations. Attitudes towards left wing 
organisations remained repressive. Even the extreme statist model in Italy does 
not have a coherent profile. As we have already said, there were large areas of 
delegation in welfare and education to the Catholic church, and an official 
treaty, the Concordato, was signed with the Church in 1929 to formalise this 
“conciliation”. The conciliatory attitude of Fascism towards the Catholic Church 
also involved certain political and social values-. The political and social doctrine 
of Church and fascism had important links and common points as far as the form 
of desirable social assets and the formulation of public policies were concerned: 
corporatism, ruralism, the subordinate role of woman, the central place of the 
family, for instance. The extreme statism of political rights (no pluralism and no 
incidence) did not go hand in hand with full statism in social rights. The Fascist 
welfare model followed a strategy of sub-ordered, partial and controlled 
delegation, and reproduced and reinforced hierarchies and social differences in 
line with the corporate model. This model, partially bom before the birth of the 
authoritarian regimes, was destined to survive partially both in Italy and in 
Germany.
In Italy, the societal model did not work in the genetic phase, because of 
lack of support, especially in the South, and because workers’ and religious 
organisations were not loyal to the regime. Flowever, the strength of the Catholic 
Church made excessive change and radical movements in the statist sense 
impracticable (in the liberal period) and prevented a coherent application of 
extreme statism (in the Fascist period).
In Italy therefore statism remained weak. After the fall of Fascism, the 
Catholic party, the Christian Democrats, took a dominant position in the 




























































































This explains the constant conflicts between the majority and opposition, which 
concern the societal delegation and structures close to the majority - for 
example, the financing of the largely Catholic private schools. The situation 
produced a weak statist party-centred type of citizenship17. Parties in 
government managed welfare with a patronage system in order to increase their 
own consensus. In the sharing out of power, even the opposition parties were 
included, although in a subordinate way. through representation in management 
bodies and the presence of unions (both linked to political groups in the majority 
and opposition) in offices and organisms responsible for assigning indemnity 
and for the formation of employment lists. The imbalance in the management of 
welfare was mirrored by a balance in public decision-making. The electoral 
system was highly proportional, and an important decisional role was entrusted 
to Parliament, especially Parliamentary commissions, where the opposition was 
also represented. This system broke down after the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
giving a definitive blow to the anti-democratic temptations of the Italian 
opposition. It was followed by a “conversion” to democracy of both the 
Communist party (the largest in Europe) and the post-Fascist party. Weakened 
in their function as “bastions of democracy”, the majority parties were 
overwhelmed by the movement against corruption taken by the magistrates. This 
revealed the imbalance between majority and opposition in relation to illegal 
behaviour, such as the bribes obtained by firms for the assignment of public 
contracts. It led to the conviction that an alternation of opposition and majority 
in Government could limit the propensity to share out resources and that this 
could be made possible by modifying the electoral system to a majority system. 
The political class was obliged to change the law under pressure from public 
opinion which forced a referendum to abrogate the proportional nature of the 
previous electoral law for election to the Senate. Given the critical role of the 
small Catholic parties, bom from the ashes of the Christian Democrats, in 
deciding the victory of the moderate and progressive cartels, the electoral law 
was constructed in such a way as to allow their survival. The fall of the old 
parties of government left room for two new actors: the Northern League, a 
party which upheld the interests of the Northern regions with successionist 
tendencies, and Forz.a Italia, a party led by Silvio Berlusconi, the owner of three 
television networks and under investigation for corruption. This new double 
anomaly justified continuous switching from one line-up to another: the League 
“discovered” it was allied with a dangerous person, the leader of Forza Italia, 
and caused the government to fall. Ex-fascists and ex-communists in the two 
opposite electoral cartels and in the alternate government formations justified 
the intermittent radicalisation of the conflict between majority and opposition. 
What followed was a division which, with respect to the past, alternated more





























































































within the majority of the moment than between majority and opposition, right 
and centre left. The majority however does not alternate in Westminster style 
(“everything for one”) nor according to the consociative model (“always a little 
for everyone”). Majorities which split and recomposed tend to reconstruct the 
“monopolistic coalition” of the centre (Famed 1980. Salvadori 1990) w hich had 
characterised the political system from Italian unity until the crisis of the 
nineties. A system conceived as bipolar and based on alternation in government 
is in fact reproducing old “transformism” mechanisms (people elected in one 
cartel move to the opposing cartel once elected).
Em ancipatory M odels
The Statist Emancipatory Model.
Up to now we have focused our attention more on the internal élite - those 
already in power - and their strategies to incorporate or neutralise the external 
élite. Now we switch our focus to the external élite and their strategies of violent 
conquest or pacific entry into power.
In the conservative cases, the internal élite follows strategies of direct or 
indirect incorporation of the masses mobilised by modernisation processes. 
They can either rely upon existing social organisations (unions, churches, 
societies) or can try to repress them and face the masses directly by granting 
(empty) political rights and social provisions, and providing alternative 
organisations controlled by the state. Similarly, external élites that lead the game 
in the emancipating models can follow two different strategies. Through indirect 
conquest or entry they virtually accept the existing rules of the game and are 
prepared to share at least part of the power with the old élite. The indirect, 
mediated strategy, whether emancipatory or conservative, needs in fact to be 
accepted by all the main actors. If just one actor raises the level of conflict, the 
strategy is likely to turn into a form of direct incorporation or conquest, and the 
case switches to a statist one. Disloyal organisations must be dismantled and 
replaced with forms of centralised government or with new loyal structures. 
“Before 1789, the French State like many others, used to govern indirectly at 
local level, using its priests and its noblemen to mediate (...). Parisian rebels had 
to face the difficulties of governing without mediators; they tried with the 
committees and the militia appeared after the 1789 revolutions, but it was hard 
to control them from the centre. Thus, more or less at the same time, they 
redesigned on the administrative map of the country, a network of departments, 
districts, cantons and communes. And they sent government commissioners to 
promote the revolutionary organisation on spot. They established the direct 




























































































None of the models illustrated in the previous section aimed to subv ert the 
social hierarchies. By contrast, the intention of the emancipatory models is to 
modify and even subvert class relations in order to free new social strata or 
disadvantaged groups. In France, for the first time, a coalition that included 
lower classes was established in government. Old élites were withdrawn and the 
new ones changed the rules of the game to their advantage.
In the strategy of direct conquest, typical of the statist systems, social 
strata previously excluded or quasi-excluded come to the control decision­
making arenas; they are not simply co-opted by the internal elite. The statist 
conservative model implies repression of external emerging élite, whereas the 
statist emancipating model implies repression of old internal élite. More 
generally, the statist model, though it claims to represent the people and to be 
“democratic” even in its 20th century versions, excludes or even suppresses 
large parts of civil society and many political actors, i.e. those social and 
political groups who do not happen to agree with the regime or to fit its criteria 
of social decency.
In revolutionary France, the rules of the game were subverted and fixed 
into written constitutions aimed to draw a breaking line with the past. They 
included a broad extension of the right to vote (universal male suffrage), but this 
was limited to people loyal to the revolution18. The new regime excluded traitors 
not only from the vote, but from the right of being citizens, and even the right of 
being alive.
In fact, the conflict in the country was so deep and extensive that only a 
minority of those entitled to vote actually did so. Many who did not identify 
themselves with the regime, the apathetic and diffident citizens that the 
revolution did not dare to mobilise, simply abstained. In 1792, the Convention 
that was supposed to be elected by universal suffrage (the number entitled to 
vote was seven million) was in fact voted by seven hundred thousand people. 
The link between loyalty and citizenship is dramatically unmasked here, as in all 
the 20th century’s authoritarian versions of the statist model.
Some demand for homogeneity tinges any kind of citizenship, but in some 
cases this can reach the extreme of depriving people of their nationality, or even 
their lives, just because they belong to religious, social or political minorities. 
The universalism of these regimes means that the extension of the right to vote 
is only rhetorical and the pluralism and competitiveness of political rights is
18 Pierre Rosanvallon (1992) acutely observed that universal suffrage was brought more by the 
circumstances than by the desire of an enlightened élite. But this observation is applied to the 




























































































low, as opposition is banned. By contrast, the impact of the vote is high, 
deputies are bound by compulsory mandates and their delegation can be revoked 
at any moment according to the “people’s will”. In fact, if this small intensive 
minority manages to survive physically and politically, it may overthrow its 
leaders. Or, to put it another way, certain leaders may use the formal impact of 
this selected group of people to get rid of their enemies. Veiled by a top-down 
rhetoric, these regimes practice a top down ruling. The level of incidence too is 
more rhetoric than practical reality.
The high impact of the vote is the other aspect of an élite which is 
formally responsive to the electorate. But here, as in other authoritarian regimes 
and parties, the trust between voters and élite is turned upside down. The 
electorate has to enjoy the confidence of the élite in power, the peripheries 
depend on the centre, the legislative on the executive.
We have defined as rules o f transmission, those rules that transmit 
decisions from one political body to another. The more statist authoritarian the 
model of citizenship, the more public decision-making tends to be concentrated 
in a single, or in a small number of select bodies, e.g. the Cabinet, and then 
rigidly transmitted to the others. The more statist authoritarian the model of 
citizenship, the more unfair the rules o f translation, i.e. the rules which allow 
only loyal supporters into crucial bodies. In this way, self-defining democratic 
citizenship can act unconstrained by people’s consent. Summing up, power here 
is concentrated in controlled bodies and people (rules of transmission) and/or 
only loyal people are admitted to relevant bodies, even the electorate (rules of 
translation).
In the case of revolutionary France, the State had a strong hold over civil 
society. Revolutionary power tried to reconcile political and social democracy 
(Danzelot 1984) through the ateliers de travail (state workshops), public 
investment and official fixed prices.
The Jacobine Constitution (art.21 ) obliged the state to find a job for the 
able-bodied and means of survival for those who were not. In 1794, the first 
nucleus of a national health service was introduced: both secular and religious 
charities were nationalised and a national body for social security set up (Girotti 
1998, 123-124). The aim of these policies was to reduce the economic 
uncertainty of the lowest classes, but it was an intention which was not really 
put in practice. Real welfare was still to come, but these provisions were 
extensive and incisive for the times. However, the provisions concerned those 
urban working classes whose consent was crucial for the revolution, so even the 




























































































In social rights, as in political ones, universalism was paradoxically 
partisan. Embryonic welfare showed manipulative and coercive features. We 
can judge the pluralist attitudes of this regime and its consideration of social 
autonomy by looking at schooling. Education was first delegated to the 
“conforming” clergy, who were freed from obedience to the Pope. Then it was 
managed directly by the revolutionary state which prized it as a crucial 
instrument for transmitting republican values. The attempt to create a new 
culture reached its zenith with the invention of a state religion. In this context, 
the prohibition of trade unions (Law La Chapelier, June 14. 1791) cannot simply 
be considered an application of those free-market principles dear to the 
emerging bourgeoisie (like the British anti-combination Laws). It was, in tact, 
accompanied by the introduction of compulsory employment cards which were a 
clear public order measure (Salvadori 1990, II). Summing up, the plurality and 
autonomy of social rights were quite low.
The tendency of this model to contrast both to social privileges and social 
freedom is immense, and shows the risks of an over-statist citizenship, which 
deprives its members of customs, identity, belonging and resources.
Let us single out now the factors which can influence the rise of an 
emancipatory statist model of citizenship.
1) Level and Form o f Domestic Political Conflict.
At the beginning of any revolution, the conflict is, by definition, at its 
maximum, bit it remains high and complex for a long time. I say “complex” 
because in France, alongside with the classical conflicts of religion and class, 
were the institutional conflict (monarchy or republic) and the dynastic conflict 
(which family?).
2) Level o f Economical Competition.
Here we find countries of the second wave of industrialisation, such as France, 
where state intervention was necessary to permit take off and to protect national 
economy. In this particular case, France already had a strong tradition of state 
intervention in economy, such as in the mercantilist period.
3) Level o f International Conflict.
This is initially high: the overturning of social relations in one country causes 
strong international reactions which are fanned by the desire to extend and 




























































































4) Width and Power o f Dominant Coalitions.
The winning coalition was both limited and radical. The core consisted of the 
intellectual lower bourgeoisie, artisans and the urban industrial classes - 
aristocracy, clergy and farmers were excluded. It was a coalition of emerging 
classes, which gave the model its emancipating feature, but the narrowness of 
the winning coalition and the strength of the opposition gave the model its statist 
features.
5) Culture o f Ruling Elite and Conception o f Citizenship.
In authoritarian regimes, even the (pseudo) emancipatory ones, the boundary 
between foreigner and citizen is mobile and arbitrary. In 1789 Sieyes suggested 
expelling from the nation the privileged classes and all those that the red 
revolutions would come to call “class enemies”. Citizenship could be lost if one 
was not a member of the social groups which took power in the Revolution, i.e. 
did not belong to the “right class”, or if one did not accept the revolution, i.e. did 
not have the “right ideas”. Citizenship was based on a sentient civique (Wenden 
1987, 45), a civic oath of adhesion to republican values. Tallien declared: “The 
only foreigners in France are the bad citizens”. Consequently, the constitution of 
24 June 1793, even if never applied, considered that foreigners with particular 
merits could be admitted to the rights of French citizenship at all levels. On 26 
August 1792, French citizenship was granted to seventeen eminent foreigners, 
but in another phase of the revolution, some of them were arrested and executed 
(Brubaker, 1992,56).
Later on the status of citizen was given to long term immigrants. In 1851, 
for the first time the so-called “double jus soli” rule was introduced, according 
to which foreigners bom in France from a foreign parent also born in France 
became citizens at birth. But according to the same law, and also the current 
French nationality law (March 1998), foreigners can refuse French citizenship 
on coming of age. This opportunity of opting out was used in the past to avoid 
military service, but with the 1871 law, this opportunity was temporarily 
abolished. It was necessary to prevent foreign workers from avoiding military 
service, which also meant progressing better in a career as artisan and marrying 
better (Weil, 1997). In the early stages of this universalistic conception of the 
nationality law (shaped more on the jus soli than other European versions), there 
was a need to impose duties on those foreigners who enjoyed French rights. A 
sort of legal equality among all people resident in France was affirmed. 
Furthermore, apart from political rights, other rights of French citizens were also 
granted to foreigners. In France, citizens’ rights tend to become human rights. 
This capacity of the rights to abstract from the condition received at birth shows 




























































































individual from his personal and social history.
The standardisation of rights, and equality in the face of the law is one ol 
the basic values of the republic. Sieyes affirms: “1 imagine the law as if it was at 
the centre of a great globe and all citizens, without exception, are on the surface 
of this globe, all of them have the same distance from the law, and are 
dependent on it (...) and equally protected” (Brubacker. 1992. 39-40). This 
anonymous citizenship, which is detached from social belongings, is very easily 
undermined: public power itself, which is its only guarantee, can take it away as 
it gave it.
The principle of legitimisation of a new élite is popular sovereignty. 
Because of this, the extension of the vote must include all citizens. In fact, in 
France, universal suffrage was used to vote the Convention of 1792. and 
introduced with the Constitution of 1793. Finally after the restoration and the 
period of liberal monarchy (which permitted a census based system), it entered 
constitutional framework definitively in 1848. In the same year, it was adopted 
in Switzerland. In both countries, however, women were excluded from voting 
(until 1949 in France and 1970 in Switzerland), as they were in the Republican 
United States. It is well known that Rousseau, the most important theoretician of 
the emancipating republican model, excluded women from political citizenship 
and, in the sphere of gender, supported the traditional system of relations. Susan 
Moller Okin (1979, 114-115) referring to Rousseau in Emile and Nouvelle 
Eloise comments that, in these texts, the philosopher hopes that precise roles 
between genders will be restored. He prizes women’s ignorance and their 
subjection to men, and claims that the preservation of traditional rules in private 
life are necessary for re-establishing family morality on which the new 
republican morality can be based. In Le contract social he observes that “the 
most ancient and the only natural society is the family” and within the family, 
the subjection of the wife is essential for two reasons: the need for a prevailing 
authority in the case of disagreement, the impossibility of assigning this 
authority to a person frequently distracted because of pregnancies, and finally 
the need for men to count on a sure descent. The subjection of the woman is not, 
as we see here, a forgotten feature of the past, a prudential oblivion in the 
process of innovation, it is, on the contrary, seen as a constitutive element of the 
democratic morality. Gender hierarchical relations must be considered an 
important feature of the democratic model and one of its major limits (Held, 
1987, cap. Ill ; Elshtain, 1981; Pateman, 1988, 1989).
In line with this model, the doctrine of “republican maternity” was 
essential to the construction of young democracy in the United States (Kerber, 
1980). Removed from the roughness and partiality of the political fight, the 




























































































educating her children and future (male) citizens, offering a moral example to 
her husband. This ideology made it possible to consider a very private function 
(the education of children, and physical and psychological care of the husband) 
as a public function (transmission and preservation of the republican morality) 
(Mcdonagh, 1991). Democratic citizenship excluded women because their place 
at home was necessary to sustain republican morality; the fullness of male 
citizenship implied the exclusion of females. The democratic love for ancient 
virtues is expressed by attempting to reproduce the social organisation were the) 
first flourished: as in Athens, the methecs in charge of organising material life 
enabled citizens to devote themselves fully to public life. In the same way. 
French and American women who were assigned to family care, enabled the 
citizens of the new republics not only to look after their businesses, but also 
politics. Ursula Vogel (1991) correctly observes that the exclusion from the 
political community is a constitutive element of the regime. Democratic 
citizenship is shaped to fit men’s needs and value; it is a manly citizenship.
In fact, the right to vote is made dependent on the capacity and 
availability to defend the country, or having served in the army. But this is a 
civic duty to which only men by law are admitted. Quite cleverly, French 
revolutionary women, the so-called tricoteuses, asked the Legislative Assembly 
as a priority to permit the forming of a feminine civic guard, because they 
understood that military service was a basic requirement to accede to citizenship 
rights. Their request was obviously rejected.
The same motivations were used in the States by the democrats to exclude 
the Afro-American minority from political citizenship. In connection with the 
American Revolution Shklar observes (1991, 51): “Winning republicans refused 
wealth as a sign of virtue, and they immediately took race instead. The soldier- 
citizens of New York thought the Afro-American should not have the right to 
vote, because they did hadn’t deserved it as members of the civic guard. When 
someone pointed out that it was the guard that did not admit blacks, the 
argument was considered insufficient”.
In any case, emancipating models are more generous towards ethnic 
minorities and colonies, than towards women. At the beginning of the 
revolutionary period (1789-93), the constitutional assembly introduced local 
assemblies in the colonies with the Act of 28 March 1790. The first legislative 
assembly granted political rights to all free men. The Convention voted the 
abolition of trade in men and slavery, making all men both free and voters. The 
constitutional assembly declared the colonies to be a part of national territory, 
but voted not to include these areas under the jurisdiction of a constitution voted 
for the mainland, and decided not to subject the colonies to laws which would be 




























































































the réintroduction of the republic in 1848, slavery was definitively abolished, 
and French citizenship was granted legally to the inhabitants of the colonies 
(West Indies, Reunion, the Four Territories and Senegal). Algeria, at that time, 
was not a metropolitan territory nor a colony, it was under the direct control of 
the army. Local assemblies gave the colonies a relatively autonomous status, but 
this status was not extended to other conquests, and was in any case reformed by 
an Imperial Senate Act in 1854, that decided the colonies should be ruled by 
imperial decree, i.e. directly from the centre. In other words, the model of direct 
integration was applied, in modified form, also to the colonies. This situation 
continued till 1949, even though in moderated form and with the substitution of 
governmental decrees for imperial acts. An exception was made for the 
Territories cited above, which had already received a special status. The Fourth 
Republic went back to 1848 rules and traditions and, through a series of acts 
which ended with the law of 7 May 1946, direct integration assumed a 
democratic form. Under this law, all inhabitants of overseas French territories 
became citizens without distinctions of civic and personal legal status. The 
Empire became the French Union. In 1956, two years before their independence, 
the electorate in the former colonies was more or less one third of the 
metropolitan one: but there were only 33 representatives of North Africa 
(Delavignette, 1982).
In this model, the cultural attitude is based on the assumption that social 
relations and assets are constraining and false constructions which have to be 
dismantled and rebuilt by the moral action of the law. The law is an act of will, 
the expression of the collective will and is inspired by principles of equity. It is 
not the outcome of a spontaneous process, nor the result of a compromise 
between many actors. The general will of Rousseau is contrary to the will of a 
few privileged people, but it is not plural. The individual is given back his 
natural right to equality, but no right to diversity is foreseen. In the happy 
spontaneity of the natural state, which Rousseau wanted others to share, there 
could be gender differences, but not differences of opinion. This subversion 
applied to some social relations and not to others (to class privileges, for 
instance, but not to gender privileges), it was illiberal and anti-pluralist (it could 
not accept the principle there can be many different ways - equally deserving 
respect - of interpreting the common good)19.
So, just as the conservative statist model can be considered a prototype of 
the right wing totalitarism of the 20th century, the emancipating model was a 
forerunner of left wing totalitarism. Both models enable us to understand the 
risks of an excessive supremacy of the state over civil society.
” David Held (1989) defines this democracy model, in cultural terms as a democracy of 




























































































The fourth model and path to citizenship is the societal emancipatory one. In 
fact it is the first modem model and the only one to survive, at least partially, 
today. We adopt as a prototype of this fourth kind of citizenship the 
Scandinavian case, and in particular the example of Sweden between the 1920s 
and 1930s.
It may seem a big leap forward to modernity to deal with the 
Scandinavian cases, but in many respects they can be considered latecomers. In 
the previous cases we have examined the rights of citizenship at their outset, 
when they were addressed to individuals, or were extended to the lower classes. 
In Sweden, representation by estates persisted until 1866 but, as in Norway and 
Finland, representatives of the Fourth Estate already sat on the Diet. This helps 
explain the greater familiarity of Scandinavian working classes with political 
dignity. Nevertheless, universal suffrage based on the individual vote was 
introduced only in 1907 (the plural vote lasted till 1918) and the Cabinet became 
responsible to Parliament only in 1917. We should note that the extension of 
suffrage did not come at the same time in all Scandinavian countries. “During 
the period between 1850 and 1900, Denmark had the most generous extension 
of suffrage among the four Scandinavian countries” (Kuhnle 1975, 25). In 1872, 
only 2.2 percent of the adult male population in Sweden was entitled to vote 
(Kuhnle 1975, 18). Romanelli (1979, 443) considered the overall percentage of 
voters in Sweden very low when compared with contemporary European 
countries. In 1878, the percentage of voters in Sweden was exceeded not only by 
countries with universal or wide suffrage (in 1877 France had 26.9 %, in 1878 
Germany 20 %, and in 1873 Denmark 15.46 %), but also by gradualist 
countries. For instance, 8.8 % of the population in Great Britain in 1880 had the 
right to vote.
All things considered, the model is not a pioneering one as far as modem 
citizenship rights are concerned. It does, however, have certain exceptional 
features, like the high early level of literacy and political representation of 
farmers. But in Sweden there was no precocity in individual political rights 
(either in extension or in incidence) and even social rights did not come early. 
The first voluntary health insurance scheme, poorly funded by the state, started 
in 1891. Work accident insurance, also covered by a low level of public funding, 
was introduced in 1901. At the beginning of this century, Liberals and 
Conservatives of the various Scandinavian countries still accepted the classic 
British distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor - the former to 
be helped, the latter considered a danger to the public order (Kuhnle 1978).




























































































The long wave of free market oriented, restrictive social policies arrived 
in Sweden from Britain, which had significant commercial trade and cultural 
contacts with Sweden. These policies arrived quite late however. A repressive 
Poor Law was introduced in 1871, when in Britain it was already facing serious 
difficulties and criticism. It would prove quite hard to use Sweden as a virtuous 
model before the twenties. The same applies to Norway and Denmark which 
were influenced not only by Britain, but also (and sometimes more) by 
Germany. Scandinavian countries in the first decade of the century remained not 
only backward, but extremely diversified. In some respects, they remained ver) 
different until after the Second World War and, if we include Finland, until the 
fifties. Nevertheless, some features of the societal emancipating model that still 
characterises to some extent the Nordic area were beginning to emerge in the 
20s and 30s. Let us now have a look at them.
The indirect rise to power, typical of societal strategies operating from 
below, implies at least a temporary cohabitation of the new élite with the 
ideologically most similar part of the old élite. There is a transition period in 
which the previous external élite, parties that represent previously excluded 
certain social strata, sit in a coalition government together with the previous 
internal élite. In Scandinavia the Fourth Estate’s parties came into power earlier 
than elsewhere. There was a short lag between party foundation, electoral 
success and entry into government. This early access to decision-making arenas 
reinforced the reformist features of working class organisations. Decisions had 
to be taken and bargaining was necessary with other élites, new parties had to be 
able to gain and keep electoral consent and prove effective. When working class 
parties came to power, suffrage was already universal and this forced them to 
perform well in order to gain consent in a large competitive electoral market. 
The regime was a parliamentary one and this implied bargaining and dealing.
In Sweden, the Social Democracy party was founded in 1889 and had an 
excellent electoral performance after universal male suffrage was introduced in 
1907. It entered the government, sharing power with the Liberals in 1917, then 
ruled alone in 1920, between 1921-1922, between 1924-1926 and then 
uninterruptedly from 1932 to 1976. It came back to government in 1982 and 
then started a period of alternation in and out of government that has lasted to 
the present day.
The rules of the game were changed smoothly in Sweden. In fact, the 
continuation of the monarchy was not questioned and has never been seriously 
put in doubt. Cohabitation was political (between competing parties), 
institutional (between Crown and Parliament) and organisational (between 
classes within the same party). The foundation of working class parties was the 




























































































renters) and urban working people. This strong social coalition was able to 
organise itself, come into power and make good use of the state, allowing the 
emergence of an attractive model of citizenship.
Political rights enjoy an high degree of extension and equality. The 
Scandinavian countries have retained proportional systems, rather than systems 
that are more “expressive and equalitarian” in representing parties and voters. 
Pluralism and influence of political rights also score high, though the increasing 
tendency to form coalition governments reduces the impact of people vote. On 
other dimensions of political rights Scandinavian systems have positive features 
that have increased over time. The delay between male and female universal 
suffrage was narrow in Scandinavian countries (it was granted to both genders 
simultaneously in Denmark and Finland). The Nordic area is the region where 
women were first (and increasingly) well represented in political bodies. 
Scandinavian countries were the first in Europe to grant a local vote to non EU 
immigrants.
Social rights in this model are incisive, strong, equal and extended, but are 
not fully standardised, since a degree of autonomy remained for long time (they 
were not always managed by the state). Despite the example of other countries, 
the “socialist state” did not even pretend to become an entrepreneur. Social 
rights were the outcome of policies which were extremely innovative for their 
time (Telo 1988). For instance, the reduction of unemployment was achieved by 
increasing public employment and spending, thus destroying the balance of 
payments myth, until then also believed by progressive parties and economists.
Welfare has gradually built up and allowed women to enter labour market 
and involve men in those domestic duties not devolved to social services. 
Devolution of care functions to social services has been limited by recent 
reforms and indicates the general crisis in which the model finds itself (Esping- 
Andersen 1990, Langan and Ostner 1991, Borchorst 1994, Bussemaker and van 
Kersberge 1994, Sainsbury 1994).
Taking some liberties, we can define this model -  while it was in good 
health - as societal. Social security has long been managed by the unions: health 
insurance from 1891-1955 (in Denmark from 1892-1960, in Finland until 1963), 
unemployment subsidies from 1934 until the present (in Denmark since 1907 
and in Finland since 1917, and in Norway from 1906 to 1958). Retirement funds 
were managed by the unions from 1913 (in Denmark 1891, in Norway 1936, 
and in Finland 1937) up to the introduction of National Retirement Programmes, 
but supplementary pensions are still managed by the Unions (Flora 1991). The 
private school (friskoler) financially supported by the state is the main 




























































































extension, relevance and redistribution capacity of Scandinavian social rights 
give this model an emancipating dimension, while the indirect management of 
the welfare give it a societal character. Social rights are strong, equal and 
extended but not standardised, as is confirmed by the renewed attitude to respect 
their pluralism and culturalism in the face of immigration (Soysal 1994).
We can begin to see that huge public expenditure is not sufficient to give 
the model statist features. Similarly, corporate representation based on interests 
or on ethnicity recognised by the state does not say much about the nature of a 
regime, and is not enough to distinguish between authoritarian and liberal 
corporativism, between fascist and social-democratic corporatism. There are 
strong differences also between democratic regimes as far as relations between 
state and organised interests are concerned (Lembruch, 1979). The associational 
subsystem and organised social interests in Sweden have greater independence 
compared to Germany20. In Germany corporatism is promoted by the State and 
embedded in a public law network. This is the result not only of a persistent 
feudal imprint, but also of American intervention in drawing up the constitution 
(the US was concerned to avoid the disniptive fragmentation and social conflicts 
that had characterised the Weimar Republic). By contrast, bargaining practices 
in Sweden were first introduced at social level and then registered by the state. 
Statist and societal types of corporatism allow us - as Schmitter (1983) has 
suggested - to distinguish not only between democratic and authoritarian 
regimes, but also within democratic regimes.
A particular form of corporatism confirms our thesis about the traditional 
societal character of the Swedish model, and so does the party organisation, 
which was for long time indirect, based on unions and leagues, as in the British
case.
Let us now see how the rise of this model is influenced by our variables.
1 ) Level and Form o f Domestic Political Conflict.
The “revolution in two phases” planned by the social-democrats when translated 
into practice becomes reformism. As we have already seen, the internal 
organisation of the party is indirect; it is made up of parliamentary groups and 
trade unions. This form of organisation reinforces the societal syndrome, since it 
makes the party management depend both on workers’ associations and the 
electors’ vote. At the same time, it reinforces the social democratic tendency to 
reformism, because the representatives of trade unions and the members of





























































































parliament are obliged to solve problems, bargain and reach compromises. B\ 
contrast, organisations based on party sections, direct enrolments or a son of 
ideological exam for membership acceptance tend to select members who share 
the same non negotiable values. The indirect party, made up of leagues and 
societies of workers, is built on organisations and people that share not only 
values, but also economic interests and needs and has aims that can be 
negotiated.
As in all Protestant countries, the conflict was simplified in the past by the 
repression of the Catholic Church, which was substituted by churches more 
loyal to the political regime. To use the expression of Henrik Stenius. the 
Lutheran Church and the State in Scandinavian countries are "two parts of the 
same body”. We find that the societal regimes are viable in political regions 
which have been pacified in the past, sometimes by force. It is possible to set 
civil society free because it does not host any dangerous antagonist. In Sweden, 
the level of the conflict was low also because one of the traditional adversaries 
of the emancipation of the fourth state, the agrarian aristocracy, was weakened 
by the action of the Crown before the citizenship-building process began. In 
Northern Sweden, as well as in Norway and Finland, there was no feudal 
system. In this country, a preferential relationship between Monarch and 
population was created to counterbalance the aristocracy. This was achieved by 
having the “fourth state” represented in the Diet at an early stage, which gave a 
good start to the emancipating dimension of this societal system.
Furthermore, in the case of Sweden, the extension of suffrage preceded 
industrial take off. This meant that for working class parties to receive sufficient 
electoral consent to be able to enter public decision-making arenas, they were 
obliged to form an alliance between industrial and country workers. The alliance 
was based on the combined effort to achieve compatible goals: full employment 
for industrial workers and price protection and lightening of debts in agriculture. 
By contrast, the potential conservative front was divided, with the industrial 
bourgeoisie on one side and the large landowners on the other. Workers were 
also able reach an agreement with their counterpart, the industrial entrepreneurs 
(full employment in exchange for public funding and public protection for 
national industry).
But the emancipating societal model has to make some use of statist tools 
and the State itself to overcome the resistance of the advantaged classes in order 
to achieve its egalitarian goals. Since these include the elimination of privilege, 
and hence the elimination of the opposition as a social subject, even if 
pacifically, this can lead to cyclical waves of radicalism which increase the 
degree of internal conflict. The emancipating societal type is therefore a sort of 




























































































be permitted by political coalitions that are already strong (at the level of civil 
society), a wide coalition made up of the weaker classes is a kind of 
intermediate situation. There must be public intervention to reach the main 
emancipating goals of redistribution of wealth, roles and social dignity.
2) Level o f Economical Competition.
When this citizenship model emerged, Scandinavian economies depended on 
exports, but the core sectors were fairly competitive in the international market. 
State intervention was necessary, but private firms were strong enough to benefit 
from of a compromise with the state: the increase in social contributions ended 
up as an advantage for the biggest firms, since it put many small enterprises out 
of business, increasing the degree of concentration. The heavy state intervention 
in the economy that characterised the social-democratic period in the thirties 
was a response to the recession. Social democrats come to power in a moment of 
great international competition, a condition that reinforced the need to make use 
of state intervention and obliged this model to adopt some statist features.
However, the key reason for the shift towards the statist area was the one 
already mentioned: the fourth estate needed to use public power to gain and 
keep positions, since though numerous, it was not strong enough in civil society. 
Nevertheless, I prefer to define the system societal, because of the balance of 
powers and agreements reached at the level of civil society(because politics is 
not emancipated from society), and the fact that parts of welfare management 
were left for long time to workers organisations.
3) Level o f International Conflict.
These systems may have had an imperialist and warring past, as in the Swedish 
case, but at the time we observe the rise of the model (at the beginning of the 
20th century), they were characterised by a lasting period of peace (Alestalo and 
Kunhlel987). Sweden and Denmark are two of the most ancient nation-states in 
Europe, and the rise of citizenship did not coincide with nation building or a 
time of war. The long established condition of the nation-state reduced the 
importance of national unity and left room for a political culture which accepted 
organised interests. (Titmuss 1958, Weir and Skocpol 1989). On the other hand, 
Norway and Finland faced a very different situation, being alternately subject to 
invasions and successful secessions.
4) Width and Power o f Dominant Coalitions.
The winning coalition was broad and composed of new actors, but this did not 




























































































and legitimisation). The industrial working class was not concentrated in big 
cities, and found agreement with the country workers relatively easily. The early 
Lutheran dominance gave the underprivileged classes a tradition of literacy, 
reinforced by early intervention of the state in the field of public education (In 
Denmark officially in 1739, but effectively 1814. in Norway 1827. Sweden 1842 
and Finland 1866)21. The disadvantaged classes underwent a process of 
emancipation in civil society, (literacy, small scale land ownership, etc.) before 
they were allowed into political arenas, as for the societal models. But. unlike 
the conservative model, the ruling and wealthy classes were more fragmented 
(due to the divisions caused by the non-Lutheran sects) than the less wealthy 
classes pressing to enter power (Flora 1991). Nevertheless, considering that the 
resources of the new actors were their organisation and ability to use the state, 
this model cannot be fully placed in the societal category.
The specific feature of the Scandinavian model is not only its liberal and 
societal character, but its emancipatory nature, due to the preponderance of the 
labour component and the consequent incorporation of the classical goals of the 
organised working class (low competition within the working force, low salary 
differentiation, low control on productivity, high salaries and high social rights). 
But these goals can be reached only in periods of economical growth, so the 
system can hold only if the most important industrial sectors are not submitted 
to strong international and if the quality, education level and skills of the 
workforce counterbalance the high cost of labour. If competition in the key 
sectors becomes stronger, and if the quality differential between national human 
capital and that of rival economies decreases, the system loses points.
Many scholars have started to underline the negative features of a model 
they used to consider as optimal. Pad (1990b), for example, though still 
sympathetic, thinks this model cannot reconcile democracy in both the economy 
and politics. It seems to me that the Swedish case, and the entire Scandinavian 
area, share a European problem. It is becoming increasingly difficult to combine 
citizenship and efficiency, diffusion and strength of social rights, the draining of 
public economic resources, capital accumulation and economic competitiveness 
in a context of rising international economic competition. In the face of 
increased international economic competition, it is difficult to maintain the 
necessary class solidarity among workers from whom very different levels of 
productivity are demanded in public services and private industry.
21 Kuhnle (1975, 48) has observed that, as always in education, this data has to be interpreted 
with caution: one thing is a claim by the State to impose education, another is to have the 




























































































In this period, the external and internal élites shared the principle that power is 
legitimate when it is the expression of popular sovereignty, which implies 
universal suffrage. The Scandinavian countries have a very different history in 
the timing of extension of the vote - in Denmark there has been universal 
suffrage for the male population since 1849, in Norway since 1897. and in 
Sweden 1907. As we have already said, when citizenship rights were first 
introduced, Denmark was still more influenced by the statist-Bismarkian model, 
and Sweden by the Anglo-societarian model, but a common feature of the 
Nordic countries was the early political involvement and démocratisation of the 
country workers. Women’s suffrage came relatively early, also because women 
“at risk of conservatism” were more easily controlled here by progressivist 
agents.
In these countries, the conception of citizenship and nationhood is “upside 
down”, as national identity sprang from democratic identity. The recent 
Scandinavian perplexities about joining the European Union and the victory of 
the “No” vote in Norway were fuelled by the fear that social rights (already 
impaired by economic crisis) and the parity between genders could deteriorate 
through association with regimes which are far less advanced in the field of 
emancipating citizenship rights. Diffidence towards the European Union is 
coupled with diffidence towards immigrants (Siim, 1998): pride in a model of 
citizenship could lead to Nordic nationalism.
As in all societal models, here too rights are the consequences of 
conquests and pressure from civil society. In Scandinavian cases, we find 
important suffragist movements. The Scandinavian “state feminism”, as it was 
defined by Hemes (1987), is in fact a feminism which originally was societal, 
based on women’s associations, supported by unions permeated by a 
universalistic culture and capable of using the state as a tool of emancipation. 
Even in present times the move from below and the political mobilisation of the 
Scandinavian women is still strong (Siim, 1998).
But in the sphere of gender parity, the Scandinavian “unlimited 
citizenship” risks inefficiency. Women have an almost full rate of employment 
(over 80%), but this has been reached through the expansion of public 
administration and services, where women’s jobs are concentrated. The public 
sector can “afford” absenteeism rates of 50% per day caused by the high 
percentage of women with small children, but as a result has had to renounce 
wage parity with the more efficient private sector. Salary diversification was 
made possible by a union split that gave birth to two unions: one for the private 
sector and the other for the public sector (Esping-Andersen, 1990b; Paci, 1990c). 
Full employment for women has been achieved, here as everywhere, through




























































































occupational segregation (Langan and Ostner, 1991) and by accepting lower pay 
rates. In fact, more discontinuous work is paid as if it were a less skilled.
Why did the Scandinavian model started to decline by the end ot the 
seventies? According Siim, the reason is not the rise of the international 
competition, but must be sought within the model itself, more specifically, the 
fact that it turned “statist” (1998, 368) and thus lost its qualities. But the changes 
citizenship had to undergo, even in the Scandinavian countries, cannot be 
explained only in this way. The revision of the pensions system, the de­
regulation of the labour market, the greater freedom given to employers in the 
utilisation of the workforce introduced in the Nordic Area as elsewhere can 
provide some explanation. An economy which is very open to the exterior is 
more subject to the effects of international competition and the state can no 
longer do much to support national business.
We should perhaps put the initial question the other way round: rather 
than “to what extent can citizenship contrast capitalism”, we could ask "to what 
extent can capitalism defeat citizenship”? In other words, to what extent can the 
transformation of the factors that Marx called “production forces” (production 
technologies, means of transport and communications, organisation of 
production and labour) transform and reduce citizenship rights? I tried to give an 
answer to this question in another article (Zincone, 1998a) and shall attempt to 
summarise the main points here.
The great reduction in costs and times of transport and communications, 
as well as the liberalisation of financial markets, has made it economically 
worthwhile to relocate certain production processes abroad, in countries where 
labour is cheaper, less protected and without union support. Relocation is 
fostered by the tough competition to obtain a share of the limited demand for 
products. Markets are already saturated in developed countries, and cannot 
expand sufficiently in the developing countries, since most of the population 
does not earn enough to buy durable goods. Another limit to industrial 
expansion is represented by ecological damage (Revelli, 1995, 1996). The 
competitiveness of some Western economies is declining, but the risk is high for 
all economies and is making it necessary to reorganise production. It has 
become more efficient to break up large factories into small production units, 
restructuring the entire production process. The new organisation makes it 
possible to achieve more flexible and sophisticated production, but also to give 
less protection to workers. A small central body remains as part of the original 
industry, and has the task of reorganision, assembly and co-ordination. It acts as 
an operative centre, surrounded by groups of subcontractors each responsible 
for one specific task, and in competition with each other. The workers of the 
main firm are normally more protected than those of the subcontractors, which 




























































































operating in the informal economy. Competition within the national working 
force increases or. to be more precise, the competition within the workforce 
resident on the national territory increases. In the Italian case, for example, 
many immigrants, even those legally resident, work in the informal economy, 
which implies worse conditions of employment (Reyneri, 1998). Large amounts 
of money, moved through investment agencies, reward and favour companies 
and economic systems that keep the cost of labour low, use a flexible working 
force, and offer low welfare contributions, i.e. those companies and national 
economies which operate against citizenship.
From these observations a major contradiction within citizenship emerges 
- a puzzle with no solution. The weakest workers, such as women and children 
in the past, and immigrants then and now. are ready to accept the most 
degrading working conditions, and in this way move the competition 
downwards, impairing the value of citizenship. The negative impact of 
immigration is strongest on non-skilled national workers and in less modern 
sectors such as agriculture and construction. Poor Italians who migrated to the 
United States in the late 19th and early 20th century were stigmatised as strike 
breakers. It is difficult to escape from the impasse of a citizenship that has to be 
“closed” to the weakest groups in order to survive. A possible way out is the 
solution already adopted by the German trade unions after World War II towards 
South European “guest workers”: to have them receive the same salaries and 
guarantees enjoyed by national workers. But today the unions are less strong 
than they were, and present immigrant workers less protected by their country of 
origin, since these states are weaker. Nowadays, downwards competition can be 
moved more easily to the free territory of the informal economy in many of the 
so-called advanced democracies. Under pressure from competition from 
economies with weak citizenship rights, the formal sector adopts at least in part 
the features of the informal one: it is more inclined to fire and hire for temporary 
jobs, increase flexibility of work hours, offer less welfare and lower fiscal costs. 
The fragile situation of the new immigrants does not only affect social rights, 
but also other categories of rights. In the field of civil rights, for example, they 
are banned from certain kinds of job, their chances of residing in the country is 
conditioned, and the religions they practice may enjoy a lower legal status 
compared with those practised by national inhabitants. If they do not possess a 
regular residency permit, they can be held and expelled at any time, though this 
is not always easily practicable. Even if immigrants have been resident in the 
country for long time, in many democracies they do not have the right to vote, 
even in local elections.
While the political strength of the workforce is reduced, because of 
internal competition and because immigrant workers almost everywhere are 




























































































and the political weight of the fear of capital escaping abroad is immense2'. As 
workers unions are weakened, and also the representation of underprivileged 
classes within social and governmental coalitions, the emancipating character of 
citizenship loses effectiveness. Control over the economic sphere is no longer in 
the hands of an individual state, whose bodies are at least partially governed by 
the electors, and this means that the influence of people’s vote is reduced. By 
contrast, non elective bodies, such as the Central Banks, which are free of 
government and parliamentary control, are acquiring new powers. Not only 
supranational bodies, such as the World Central Bank or the International 
Monetary Fund, but also private agencies, such as Moody’s or Standards and 
Poor’s, are given the task of evaluating the financial health of firms and the 
trustworthiness of firms or even national economies, and determine their 
survival. The public action of the single state is losing importance and hence the 
statist features of citizenship models. Whereas citizenship completely entrusted 
to state intervention is undesirable, a form of citizenship deprived of public 
action, i.e. a citizenship with no state or other strong public agent, cannot exist. 
Furthermore the so-called technical bodies cited above are politically and 
ideologically biased, since they translate the logic of capital (its freedom of 
movement, the free use of the workforce and of natural resources, low 
contributions and taxation) in terms of their own “neutral” aims.
Finally, we can observe that the “devil’s mill”, the disruptive and 
reshaping action of the capital is not blind to prejudice. Welfare systems in the 
democratic countries, even though to a different extent, continue to legitimise 
and have more respect for the productive function than the reproductive function 
(Frazer 1989, Nelson 1990). Italian welfare in particular gives strong support to 
workers and their families (Negri and Saraceno, 1996). Reforms now in progress 
are trying to abandon the traditional family model, but not completely 
(Saraceno, 1997). Unemployment rates of male breadwinning adults in Italy are 
almost nonexistent when compared with other categories (Reyneri, 1996).
A modern adaptation of the conservative societal model is coming back 
from the past and spreading outside its traditional terrain in British territories 
abroad. Sometimes the model is tempered by local traditions. The general 
guidelines of welfare reform (Girotti, 1998, 346) can be summarised as follows: 
minor extension (welfare reserved for the very poor), less relevance (welfare 
covers extreme cases and dramatic events), it is less generous and hence more 
conservative, and management is delegated to civil society organisations which 
makes it more societal. Some of these reforms are the consequence of the costs
!! This is a condition that Pierson himself, who judged the consequences of globalisation on 
welfare to be unimportant (1996), considered a serious handicap (1994), able to explain the 




























































































resulting from the ageing of the population (higher medical expenses, more 
pensions and fewer contributions)3'' and the decrease in revenue due to the high 
unemployment rates in many European countries. The present reform of social 
citizenship is also supported by an ideology which delegitimates public action 
and state intervention (Hirschman, 1993).
The European Union could represent an appropriate level of public 
decision-making to cope with present structural and ideological turn, but 
unfortunately the constitution of the Union, the Treaty of Rome, makes it 
difficult for the Union to become an effective political agent. The European 
Community was conceived for the creation of a common market, and it was 
possible to foster the unification of the market without the need for a common 
political will. Since the common market was already the “law” of the 
Community and then of the Union, it could be enacted and implemented by 
simple sentences of the courts (Scharpf 1999).
By contrast, to enhance and protect European citizenship rights would 
require continuous and renewed consent among the member states which would 
be difficult to achieve. Some timid steps in this direction have already been 
taken, especially with the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties. Important matters 
such as security and immigration have been moved from the third to the first 
pillar, which implies that in these fields the Union can now decide by majority. 
A more important role has been assigned to the European Parliament, elected by 
citizens, in comparison with the Council or the Commission, where the 
executive governments of member states are represented. The path towards the 
formation of a European political agent is nevertheless too slow and too 
uncertain in relation to the strong impact of the factors which are eroding the 
conquests of the emancipating models. Marshall’s hypothesis, which states that 
citizenship is a good antidote to capitalism, could perhaps be reversed: 
capitalism has proved to be a good antidote to citizenship -  the logic of the 
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Tabic 1. Transitions Towards Citizenship: a Typology.
S T A T IS T S O C IE T A L




E m a n c ip a to ry Type C
(Revolutionary France)
Type D
(Sweden in the 1920s and 1930s)
T ab le  2. M odels a n d  R igh ts
T y p e  A S ta tis t  -  c o n se rv a tiv e
Political rights Extension + Pluralism + (-) Incidence -
Social rights Extension + Pluralism + 
Autonomy -
Incidence +
T ype  B Soc ie ta l -  c o n se rv a tiv e
Political rights Extension - Pluralism + Incidence +
Social rights Extension - Pluralism + 
Autonomy +
Incidence +
T ype  C  S ta tis t  -  e m a n c ip a to ry
Political rights Extension + (-) Pluralism - Incidence + (-)
Social rights Extension + Pluralism-
Autonomy-
Incidence +
T ype  D Soc ie ta l -  e m a n c ip a to ry
Political rights Extension + Pluralism + Incidence +
Social rights Extension + Pluralism -  
Autonomy +
Incidence +
Key: the sign represents the positive/negative impact when the rights are respected, the sign in 






























































































M. ALESTALO, S. KUHNLE (1987) The Scandinavian Route: Economic, 
Political and Social Developments in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, 
ed. R. Eriksen.
A. AQUARONE (1965) L'organizzazione dello stato totalitario, Turin, Einaudi.
D. E. ASHFORD (1986) The Emergence o f the Welfare States, Oxford. Basil 
Blackwell.
U. ASCOLI (1984) Welfare State all’Italiana, Bari, Laterza.
S. ATKINS, B. HOGGETT (1984) Women and Law, London, Basil Blackwell.
L. BALBO (ed.) (1987) Time to Care, Politiche del tempo e diritti quotidiani, 
Milan, F. Angeli.
R. BAUBOCK (1991) “Immigration and Boundaries of Citizenship” in Z. 
LAYTON-HENRY (ed.). Labour Migration and the European Community after 
1982, Colchester, European Consortium for Political Science, 22-28 March.
R. BENDIX (1964) Nation-Building and Citizenship, New York, John Wiley.
R. BENDIX (1980) Re o popolo, Milan, Feltrinelli.
A. BORCHORST (1994) “Welfare States Regimes, Women’s Interests, and the 
EC” in D. SAINSBURY (ed.), op. cit.
J. BRYCE (1907) Imperialismo romano e britannico, Turin, Fratelli Bocca.
W. R. BRUBAKER (1992) Citizenship and Nationhood in France and 
Germany, Cambridge, Harward University Press.
M. BRUCE (1972) The Coming o f the Welfare State, London, Batsford.
J. BUSSEMAKER, K. VAN KERSBERGEN (1994) “Gender and Welfare 
States: Some Theoretical Reflections” in D. SAINSBURY (ed.), op.cit.
B. CONSTANT (1970) Principi di politica, Roma, Editori.





























































































J. DANZELOT (1984) L'invention dii social, Paris, Fayard.
R. DELAVIGNETTE (1982) “French Colonial Policy in Black Africa. 1945- 
1960” in L. H. GANN, P. DUIGNAN (eds.) Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
A. DUMMET (1997) “Citizenship Rights in the United Kingdom”, paper 
presented at the meeting: Conoscere il razzismo per combatterlo. Presidency of 
the Cabinet, Department of Social Affairs, Rome 27-28 October.
J. P. DUNBABIN (1986) “Le riforme elettorali e le loro conseguenze nel Regno 
Unito: 1865-1895” in P. Pombeni (ed.), op. cit.
S. N. EISENSTADT (1965) Modernization: Protest and Change, Englewood 
Cliff, Prentice Hall.
J. B., ELSHTAIN (1981) Public Man/Private Woman: Women in Social and 
Political Thought, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Y. ERGAS (1986) Nelle maglie della politica, Milan, Franco Angeli.
G. ESPING-ANDERSEN (1990) The Three Worlds o f Western Capitalism, 
Cambridge, Polity Press.
G. ESPING-ANDERSEN (1990) “Traiettorie dell’occupazione postindustriale”, 
Democrazia e Diritto, 30, 1, pp. 31-68.
E. EICK (1950) Bismarck, Turin, Einaudi.
P. FARNET1 (1980) “La coalizione monopolitista” in G. Zincone (ed.) Il vizio 
di origine, Turin, Biblioteca della Libertà, pp. 133-43.
M. FERRERA (1984) Il welfare state in Italia, Bologna, Il Mulino.
M. FERRERA (1993) Modelli di Solidarietà, Bologna, Il Mulino.
D. FISICHELLA (1976) Analisi del totalitarismo, Messina, D’Anna.
P. FLORA (1981) “The Historical Core and Changing Boundaries of the 




























































































P. FLORA, J. ALBER (1981) “Development of Welfare States and Processes of 
Modernization and Democratization” in P. FLORA, A. J. HE1DENHEIMER
(eds.), op. cit.
P. FLORA (1991) Notes from his lectures given in Turin.
P. FLORA and A. J. HE1DENHEIMER (eds.) (1981) Development o f Welfare 
States in Europe and America, New Brunswick, Transaction Books.
D. FRASER (1984) The Evolution o f British Welfare State, London, Macmillan.
D. FRASER (1989) Unruly Practices, Minneapolis, Minnesota University Press.
A. E. GALEOTTI (1994) La tolleranza, Naples, Liguori.
L. GALL (1982) Bismarck, Milan, Rizzoli.
F. GIROTTI (1998) Welfare State: storia, modelli e critica, Rome, Carocci.
A. L. GOODHART and H. G. HANBURY (1952) A History o f  English Law, 
London, ed. by W. Holdsworth Methuen, voi. 13.
R. HARRISON (1965) Before the Socialists, London, Allen and Unwin,.
F. A. HAYEK (1973) Law, Legislation and Liberty, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press.
H. HECLO (1974) Modem Social Politics in Britain and Sweden, New Haven, 
Yale University Press.
F. HEGEL (1978) Enciclopedia delle Scienze Filosofiche, Bari, Laterza, voi.2.
D. HELD (1987) Models o f Democracy, Cambridge, Polity Press.
H. M. HERNES (1987) Welfare State and Women Power, Oslo, Norvegean 
University Press.
A. O. HIRSCHMAN (1993) The Rhetoric o f Reaction, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press.
R. HUARD (1986) “Opinione pubblica, suffragio e democrazia in Europa” in P. 




























































































S. JUSS (1993) Immigration.Nationality and Citizenship. London, Mansell.
L. K. KERBER (1980) Women and the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in 
Revolutionary America, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina.
R. KOOLE, P. VAN PR A AG (1990) “Electoral competiton in a Segmented 
Society”, European Journal o f Political Research, 18, pp. 51-69.
S. KUHNLE (1978) “The Beginnings of the Nordic Welfare States: Similarities 
and Differences” Acta sociologica", 21, pp. 9-35.
S. KUHNLE (1975) Patterns o f Social and Political Mobilization: a Historical 
Analysis o f the Nordic Countries, London, Sage.
W. KYML1CKA (1996) Multicultural Citizenship, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press.
M. LANGAN and I. OSTENER (1991) “Gender and Welfare: Toward a 
Comparative Framework?” in G. Room (ed.) Toward a European Welfare 
State?, Bristol, School for Advanced Urban Studies.
Z. LAYTON-HENRY (1992) The Politics o f Immigration, Oxford, Blackwell.
G. LEMBRUCH (1979) “Liberal Corporatism and Party Government” in P. C. 
SCHMITTER and G. LEMBRUCH (eds.), Trends Towards Corporatist 
Intermediation, London, Sage.
L. LEON (1980) Storia economica e sociale del mondo: il capitalismo (1840- 
1914), Bari, Laterza.
J. LEWIS (1992) “Gender and the Development of Welfare Regimes”, Journal 
o f European, Social Policy, 3, pp. 154-73.
A. LIJPHART (1984) Democracies, Patterns o f Majoritarian and Consensus 
Government in Twenty-One Countries, New Haven and London, Yale 
University Press.
J. J. LINZ, A. STEPAN (1986) “Political Crafting of Democratic Consolidation 
or Destruction: European and South American Comparisons”, paper prepared 
for the lecture A Consultation: Reinforcing Democracy in the Americas, Carter 





























































































J. LOCKE (1948) Due trattati sul governo civile, Turin, UTHET.
C. LONZI (1970) Sputiamo su Hegel, Milan, Edizioni Rivolta Femminista.
V. L. LIDTKE (1966) The Outlawed Party: Social Democracy in Germany, 
1878-1890, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
C. MARLETT1 (1987) Emancipazaione e liberazione, Milan, F. Angeli.
T. H. MARSHALL (1992) Citizenship and Social Class, London, Pluto Press.
F. MAURO (1977) L"espansione europea: 1600-1870, Milan, Mursia.
D. MARUCCO (1980) Mutualismo e sistema politico: il caso italiano (1862- 
1904), Milan, F. Angeli.
E. Me DONAGH (1991) “Gender and the Paradox of American State 
Development”, paper presented at the workshop Gender, Citizenship and Social 
Policy, Social Science History Association, October 31.
W. H. Me NEILL (1984) Caccia al potere, Milan, Feltrinelli.
K. MIDDLEMAS (1979) Politics in Industrial Societyt, London, Rowman.
J. S. MILL (1975) Considerations on Representative Government, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press.
S. MOLLER OKIN (1979) Women in Western Political Thought, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press.
B. MOORE jr. (1966) Social Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy, Boston, 
Beacon Press.
N. NEGRI, C. SARACENO (1996) Politiche contro la povertà in Italia, 
Bologna, Il Mulino.
B. NELSON (1990) “The Origin of the Two-Channel Welfare State: 
Workmen’s Compensation and Mothers’ Aids” in L. Gordon (ed.) Women, the 
State and Welfare, Madison, University of Wisconsin.
A. ORLOFF (1996) “Gender in Liberal Welfare States: Australia, Canada, the 




























































































A. ORLOFF (1996) “Gender and the Welfare State”, Estudios Working Paper, 
Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Madrid.
M. PACI (1984) “Il sistema di welfare italiano tra tradizione clientelare e 
prospettive di riforma” in U. Ascoli (ed.) Welfare state a ll’italiana, Bari, 
Laterza.
M. PACI (1990) La sfida della cittadinanza sociale, Roma, Edizioni Lavoro.
M. PACI (1990) “Tre modelli di welfare”, paper presented at the CGIL 
management training course, Badia Fiesolana 26-28 November.
M. PACI (1990) “Percorsi nazionali verso la società post-industriale”, paper 
presented at the CGIL management training course, Badia Fiesolana 26-28 
November.
C. PATERMAN (1988) The Sexual Contract, London, Polity Press.
C. PATERMAN (1989) The Disorder o f Woman: Democracy, Feminism and 
Political Theory, London, Polity Press.
P. PIERSON (1994) Dismantling the Welfare State, Cambridge, CUP.
P. PIERSON (1995) The New Politics o f the Welfare State, Bremen, 
Universitaet Bremen.
P. POMBENI (ed.) (1986) La trasformazione politica nell'Europa liberale 
(1870-1890), Bologna, Il Mulino.
D. B. RALSTON (1990) Importing the European Army, Chicago, Chicago 
University Press.
M. REVELLI (1995) “Economia e modello sociale nel passaggio tra fordismo e 
toyotismo” in P. Ingrrao anf R. Rossanda (eds.) Appunti di fille secolo, Rome, Il 
Manifesto.
M. REVELLI (1996) Le due destre, Turin, Bollati Boringhieri.
E. REYNIERI (1996) Sociologia del Mercato del Lavoro, Bologna, Il Mulino.
E. REYNIERI (1998) “Addressing the Employment of Migrants in an Irregular 
Situation”, Technical Symposium in International Migration and Development, 




























































































see “Immigrazione ed Economia Sommersa”, Stalo e Mercato, 2. pp. 287-318.
S. ROKKAN (1982) Cittadini, elezioni, partiti, 11 Mulino, Bologna.
S. ROKKAN (1973) “Centre-Formation, Nation-Building and Cultural 
Diversity: Report on a Unesco Program” in S. N. Eisenstadt. S. Rokkan (eds.l. 
Building States and Nations. Beverly Hills, Sage.
R. ROMANELLI (1979) L ’Italia Liberale, Bologna, Il Mulino.
R. ROMANELLI (1983) “Autogoverno, funzioni pubbliche, classi dirigenti 
locali. Un’indagine del 1869”, Passato e Presente, 2, 4, pp. 35-83.
P. ROSANVALLON (1992) Le sacre dii citoyen, Paris, Gallimard.
G. H. SABINE (1964) Storia delle dottrine politiche, Milan Comunità.
D. SAINSBURY (1994) “Introduction” in D. Sainsbury (ed.) Gendering 
Welfare States, London, Sage.
M. SALVADORI (1990) Storia dell’età moderna e contemporanea, Turin, 
Loescher, vols. 1-2.
M. SALVADORI (1981) Dopo Marx, Turin, Einaudi.
G. SANI and G. SARTORI (1982) Teoria dei partiti e il caso italiano in G. 
Sartori (ed.), Milan, Sugarco.
C. SARACENO (1997) “Riforma di un welfare disuguale: limiti e prospettive di 
cambiamenti positivi”, Il Mulino, 46, pp. 158-69.
F. W. SCHARPF (1999) Governare l'Europa: legittimità democratica ed 
efficacia delle politiche nell’Unione Europea, Bologna, Il Mulino.
C. P. SCHMITTER (1983) “Teoria della democrazia e pratica neo-corporatista”, 
Stato e mercato, 9, pp. 385-423.
G. J. SCHOCHET (1969) “The Family and thè Origins of thè State in Locke’s 
Politicai Philosophy” in J. W. YOLTON and J. LOCKE (eds.) Problems and 
Perspectives, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
R. SEGATORI (1996) “Oltre l’universalismo e il particolarismo” in F. CRESPI, 




























































































J. N. SHKLAR (1991) American Citizenship: the Quest for Inclusion, London. 
Harvard University Press.
B. SUM (1998) “Vocabulary of Citizenship and Gender" in Critical Social 
Policy, 18, pp. 375-416.
Y. N. SOYSAL (1994) Limits o f Citizenship - Migrants and Postnational 
Membership in Europe, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
W. SOMBART (1976) Why is There No Socialism in the United States ’, New 
York, International Arts and Science Press.
M. TELO’ (1988) Le New Deal européen, Bruxelles, Editions de l’Universit de 
Bruxelles.
P. THANE (1986) The Foundation o f the British Welfare State, London. 
Longman.
G. THEERBORN (1977) “The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy”, 
New Left Review, 21, pp. 3-41.
C. TILLY (1975) “Reflections on the History of European State Making, and 
Western State Making and Theories of Political Transformation” in C. Tilly 
(ed.) The Formation o f National States in Western Europe, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press.
C. TILLY (1981) “Sinews of War” in AA.VV, Mobilization Center-Periphery, 
Structures and Nation Building, Bergen, Universitetforlaget.
C. TILLY (1990) Coercion, Capital and European States, Cambridge. CUP.
R. TITMUSS (1958) Essays on the Welfare State, London, Allen and Unwin.
N. TRANFAGLIA (1973) Dallo stato liberale al regime fascista: problemi e 
ricerche, Milan, Feltrinelli.
B. S. TURNER (1992) “Outline of a Theory of Citizenship” in C. Mouffe, 
Dimensions o f Radical Democracy, London, Verso.
U. VOGEL (1989) “Is Citizenship Gender Specific?”, paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the Political Science Association, Warwick, April 4-6.





























































































M. WALZER (1983) Spheres o f Justice, New York, Basic Books, chapter 2.
M. WEBER (1922) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Tubingen. Mohr.
P. WEIL (1997) “Mission d’étude des legislations de la nationalité et de 
l’immigration”, Rapport au Premier Ministre, Paris, La documentation français.
M. WEIR and T. SKOCPOL (1989) “State Structures and the Possibilities for 
Keynesian Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden. Britain, and the 
United States” in P. B. EVANS et al. (eds.).
I. WENNEMO (1994) Sharing the Costs of Children: Studies on the 
Development o f Family support in OECD Countries, Stockholm, Swedish 
Insitute for Social Research.
C. WHITOL DE WENDEN (1987) Citoyenneté, Nationalité et Immigration. 
Paris, Arcanère Editions.
G. Z1NCONE (1992) Da sudditi a cittadini, Bologna II Mulino.
G. ZINCONE (1998) “La nuova grande trasformazione e i suoi effetti sulla 
gente comune”, Il Mulino, 47, 1, pp. 5-15.
G. ZINCONE (1998) “Multiculturalism from above: Italian variation on a 
European theme” in R. Baubock and J. Rundell (eds.), Blurred Boundaries: 

























































































































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge 
-  depending on the availability of stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) -  Italy 
Telefax No: +39/055/4685 636 
e-mail: publish@datacomm.iue.it 
http://www.iue.it
From N am e.................................................................
Address..............................................................
□  Please send me a list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 2000/01





































































































Working Papers of the Robert Schuman Centre 
Published since 1998
RSC No. 98/1 
Jonathan GOLUB
Global Competition and EU Environmental 
Policy. Global Competition and EU 
Environmental Policy: An Overview
RSC No. 98/2 
lan H. ROWLANDS
Global Competition and EU Environmental 
Policy. EU Policy for Ozone Layer 
Protection
RSC No. 98/3 
Marc PALLEMAERTS 
Global Competition and EU Environmental 
Policy. Regulating Exports of Hazardous 
Chemicals: The EU's External Chemical 
Safety Policy
RSC No. 98/4 
André NOLLKAEMPER 
Global Competition and EU Environmental 
Policy, improving Compliance with the 
International Law of Marine Environmental 
Protection: The Role of the European Union
RSC No. 98/5 
Thomas HELLER
Global Competition and EU Environmental 
Policy. The Path to EU Climate Change 
Policy *
RSC No. 98/6 
David VOGEL
Global Competition and EU Environmental 
Policy. EU Environmental Policy and the 
G A T T /m O  *
RSC No. 98/7 
Andrea LENSCHOW 
Global Competition and EU Environmental 
Policy. The World Trade Dimension of 
"Greening ” the EC’s Common Agricultural 
Policy *
RSC No. 98/8 
Nick ROBINS
Global Competition and EU Environmental 
Policy. Competitiveness, Environmental 
Sustainability and the Future of European 
Community Development Cooperation *
RSC No. 98/9 
Thomas RISSE (with Daniela 
ENGELMANN-MARTIN/Hans-Joachim 
KNOPF/Klaus ROSCHER)
To Euro or Not to Euro? The EMU and 
Identity Politics in the European Union
RSC No. 98/10 
Véronique PUJAS/Martin RHODES 




European Institutional Architecture after 




New Instruments for Environmental Policy 
in the EU. New Instruments for 
Environmental Policy in the EU:An 
Overview *
RSC No. 98/13 
Stephen TINDALE/Chris HEWETT 
New Instruments for Environmental Policy 
in the EU. New Environmental Policy 
Instruments in the UK *
RSC No. 98/14
Wolfram CREMER/Andreas FISAHN 
New Instruments for Environmental Policy 
in the EU. New Environmental Policy 
Instruments in Germany *
RSC No. 98/15
Duncan LIEFFERINK 
New Instruments for Environmental Policy 
in the EU. New Environmental Policy 
Instruments in the Netherlands *
RSC No. 98/16
Kurt DEKETELAERE
New Instruments for Environmental Policy
in the EU. New Environmental Policy





























































































Susana AGULAR FERNANDEZ 
New Instruments for Environmental Policy 
in the EU. New Environmental Policy 
Instruments in Spain
RSC No. 98/18 
Alberto MAJOCCHI
New Instruments for Environmental Policy 
in the EU. New Environmental Policy 
Instruments in Italy *
RSC No. 98/19
Jan Willem BIEKART 
New Instruments for Environmental Policy 
in the EU. Negotiated Agreements in EU 
Environmental Policy *
RSC No. 98/20 
Eva EIDERSTRÔM
New Instruments for Environmental Policy 




New Instruments for Environmental Policy 
in the EU. Environmental Management 
Systems: The European Regulation *
RSC No. 98/22 
Jos DELBEKE/Hans BERGMAN 
New Instruments for Environmental Policy 
in the EU. Environmental Taxes and 
Charges in the EU *
RSC No. 98/23 
Carol HARLOW




The Unemployment Problem in Europe: 
Lessons from Implementing the OECD Jobs 
Strategy *
RSC No. 98/25 
Paul ORMEROD
A Business Cycle Model with Keynesian 
Micro-Foundations: The Policy Implications 
for Unemployment *
RSC No. 98/26
Richard CLAYTON/Jonas PONTUSSON 
The New Politics of the Welfare State 
Revisited: Welfare Reforms, Public-Sector 
Restructuring and Inegalitarian Trends in 
Advanced Capitalist Societies *
RSC No. 98/27 
Paul JOHNSON
The Measurement of Social Security 
Convergence: The Case of European Public 
Pension Systems since 1950 *
RSC No. 98/28 
Claudio M. RADAELLI 
Creating the International Tax Order: 
Transfer Pricing and the Search for 
Coordination in International Tax Policy
RSC No. 98/29
Wisla SURAZSKA
On Local Origins of Civil Society in Post- 
Communist Transition
RSC No. 98/30 
Louis CHARPENTIER 
The European Court of Justice and the 
Rhetoric of Affirmative Action
RSC No. 98/31 
Arthur BENZ/Burkard EBERLEIN 
Regions in European Governance: The 
Logic of Multi-Level Interaction
RSC No. 98/32
Ewa MORAWSKA
International Migration and Consolidation of 
Democracy in East Central Europe: A 




Central Bankers, the Ideational Life-Cycle
and the Social Construction of EMU
RSC No. 98/34 
Claudio M. RADAELLI 
Policy Narratives in the European Union: 
The Case of Harmful Tax Competition
RSC No. 98/35
Antje WIENER
The Embedded Acquis Communautaire 





























































































RSC No. 98/36 
Liesbet HOOGHE
Supranational Activists or Intergovernmental 
Agents? Explaining the Orientations of 
Senior Commission Officials Towards 
European Integration
RSC No. 98/37
Michael J. ARTIS/Wenda ZHANG
Core and Periphery in EMU: A Cluster
Analysis
RSC No. 98/38 
Beate KOHLER-KOCH 
Territorial Politics in Europe - 
A Zero-Sum Game?
La renaissance de la dimension territoriale en 
Europe : entre illusion et réalité
RSC No. 98/39 
Michael KEATING 
Territorial Politics in Europe - 
A Zero-Sum Game?
The New Regionalism. Territorial 
Competition and Political Restructuring in 
Western Europe
RSC No. 98/40
Patrick LE GALES 
Territorial Politics in Europe - 
A Zero-Sum Game?




Territorial Politics in Europe - 
A Zero-Sum Game?
EU Cohesion Policy and Competing Models 
of European Capitalism
RSC No. 98/42 
Burkard EBERLEIN 




Domestic Responses to Free Trade and Free 
Finance in OECD Countries
RSC No. 98/44
Amy VERDUN









The Hard Core: The Franco-German
Relationship and Agricultural Crisis Politics
in the European Union
RSC No. 98/47
Henri SNEESSENS/Raquel FONSECA/B. 
MAILLARD
Structural Adjustment and Unemployment 
Persistence (With an Application to France 
and Spain)
RSC No. 98/48 
Liesbet HOOGHE
Images of Europe. Orientations to European 
Integration among Senior Commission 
Officials
RSC No. 98/49 
Andre L1EBICH
Ethnic Minorities and Long-Term 
Implications of EU Enlargement
RSC No. 98/50 
Emil J. KIRCHNER
Transnational Border Cooperation Between 
Germany and the Czech Republic: 
Implications for Decenualization and 
European Integration
RSC No. 98/51
Susan SENIOR NELLO 
The Economic Accession Criteria for EU 
Enlargement: Lessons from the Czech 
Experience
RSC No. 98/52 
Michael J. ARTIS/Wenda ZHANG 
Membership of EMU: A Fuzzy Clustering 
Analysis of Alternative Criteria
RSC No. 98/53 
Ewa MORAWSKA 
The Malleable Homo Sovieticus: 































































































EMU and the Mediterranean Area
RSC No. 99/2 
Carol HARLOW
Citizen Access to Political Power in the 
European Union
RSC No. 99/3 
Francesca BIGNAMI 
Accountability and Interest Group 
Participation in Comitology
RSC No. 99/4 
Melle Z0LNER 
Re-Imagining the Nation
RSC No. 99/5 
Walter MATTLI
Fora of International Commercial Dispute 
Resolution for Private Parties
RSC No. 99/6
Christoph U. SCHMID
Ways Out of the Maquis Communautaire -
On Simplification and Consolidation and the
Need for a Restatement of European Primary
Law
RSC No. 99/7 
Salvatore PITRUZZELLO 
Political Business Cycles and Independent 
Central Banks. German Governments and 
the Bundesbank (1960-1989)
RSC No. 99/8 
Veronika TACKE
Organisational Constructions of the BSE 
Problem. A Systems Theoretical Case Study 
on the Globalisation of Risk
RSC No. 99/9 
Robert SPRINGBORG 
Political SuTjciural Adjustment in Egypt: A 
Precondition for Rapid Economic Growth?
RSC No. 99/10
Rebecca Jean EMIGH/Eva FODOR/Ivdn
sz e l£ n yi
The Racialization and Feminization of 
Poverty During the Market Transition in the 
Central and Southern Europe
RSC 99/11 
John GOULD
Winners. Losers and the Institutional Effects 




A Partnership for Accession? The 
Implications of EU Conditionality for the 
Central and East European Applicants
RSC 99/13 
Tibor PAPP
Who is In, Who is Out? Citizenship, 
Nationhood, Democracy, and European 
Integration in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia
RSC 99/14
Karin FIERKE/Antje WIENER 




The Political Economy of Restructuring of 
East-West Trade: Economic Winners and 
Losers in the CEECs and EU
RSC 99/16
Tanja A. BÔRZEL
Why there is No Southern Problem. On 




National Adaptation to European Integration:
The Importance of Institutional Veto Points
RSC 99/18
Sabrina TESOKA
The Differential Impact of Judicial Politics in 




The Power of EMU-Ideas: Reforming



































































































Germany and the Enlargement of the 
European Union to the Czech Republic
RSC 99/22
Mark THATCHER
The Europeanisation of Regulation.
The Case of Telecommunications
RSC 99/23 
Daniel C. THOMAS 
Boomerangs and Superpowers: The 




Labor Markets in the European Union
RSC 99/25
Grigorii V. GOLOSOV/Edward PONARIN 
Regional Bases of Party Politics: A Measure 
and Its Implications for the Study of Party 
System Consolidation in New Democracies
RSC 99/26
Fritz BREUSS/Andrea WEBER 
Economic Policy Coordination in the EMU: 








Political Parties and Political Corruption in
Comparative Historical Perspective
RSC 99/29
Luis Manuel MACEDO PINTO DE SOUSA 
Corruption and Parties in Portugal
D C f  Q Q / i n
Jean CARTIER-BRESSON 
Corruption et partis politiques en France 
sous la V' République: une première 
réflexion sur la relation entre les 
financements occultes et l’enrichissement
RSC 99/31
Giovanna ZINCONE
Citizenship: Between State and Society
•out of print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
q090 /,
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
